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A SURVEY OF THE STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL 
EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE COMPLIANCE AND 
PROACTIVITY:  TOWARDS A THEORY OF PRECAUTION  
IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
ERICA M. MATHENY 
ABSTRACT 
Millions of factories, chemical facilities, and highways store or convey extremely 
hazardous substances (EHS) in proximity to populated residential and commercial areas.  
The proliferation of hazardous chemicals in manufacturing has led to thousands of 
facilities that store and utilize them throughout the United States. There is inherent risk to 
neighborhoods and populated areas located near facilities that use and store hazardous 
chemicals. Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) were created in 1987 as 
stakeholder based, primarily volunteer organizations that address hazardous chemical 
accident mitigation.  In addition, LEPCs were mandated with the intent of engaging 
communities in the debate about hazardous materials. Public safety has also increased in 
salience in the United States in particular since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina devastation in New Orleans. More recently, the 
earthquakes in Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, and most notably Japan have refocused 
efforts worldwide on examining policies and practices surrounding disaster management 
and response.  
 This dissertation is an examination of compliance and proactivity in LEPCs and 
how use of limited resources influences these factors.  A convenient sample of LEPCs in 
Ohio was surveyed to gather data for this causally probative study.  LEPCs that are more 
 vi 
compliant and proactive were expected to be in counties with larger, more urban 
populations that have more accident experience, and are expected to be in line with 
disaster management strategies that emphasize public involvement. The results of this 
study show a positive correlation between number of extremely hazardous substance 
facilities in a county and the compliance of that county’s LEPC. Other findings include 
limited emphasis on provision of information to the public. Emergency planning 
resources have been stretched further and further, with additional responsibilities of 
homeland security in addition to chemical safety tasks, and little to no additional funding. 
The researcher proposes LEPCs look more towards collaboration as a means of ensuring 
community security within their limited capacity. Collaboration has been noted amongst 
emergency planning agencies between LEPCs and County Emergency Management 
Agencies (EMAs), often in the form of shared staff or resources. Collaboration can lead 
to greater success for all involved parties. Future research also needs to be completed to 
re-conceptualize the idea of LEPC “proactivity” to better capture the diversity of LEPC 
activities that may fall under this umbrella.  In particular, emphasis on precautionary or 
mitigation activities may be a better use of emergency managers’ limited resources. One 
of the most significant weaknesses of the current approach, in light of the original intent 
of LEPCs as stakeholder-inclusive entities, is access to information. As hazardous 
chemical information access has become more limited and restrictive, collaboration 
between involved parties and the public is also therefore limited. This may call for more 
proactive, creative solutions on the part of regulated industry to ensure emergency plans 
contain complete hazard information with proper security protocols maintained. 
 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. xi 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... xiii 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1
Background ........................................................................................................ 1
Legislative Background ...................................................................................... 4
Hazard Reduction Activity ............................................................................... 11
Context Within Which LEPCs Operate ............................................................ 12
Statement of Research Question: ..................................................................... 13
Objectives of Research and Significance ......................................................... 17
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY ............................................................. 20
Preface to Literature Review ............................................................................ 20
Emergency Planning ......................................................................................... 22
Disaster Management Frameworks .................................................................. 25
Foundational emergency management frameworks ................................. 28
Contemporary emergency management frameworks ............................... 29
Informational Regulation ................................................................................. 36
Organizational Theory and LEPC Effectiveness .............................................. 40
Importance of decision-making to effectiveness ...................................... 44
Compliance and Proactivity ............................................................................. 47
A Note on Theory ............................................................................................. 50
Questions and Hypotheses ................................................................................ 52
 viii 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................. 57
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 57
Research Design ............................................................................................... 58
Study Sample and Population ........................................................................... 59
Validity and Generalizability ........................................................................... 61
LEPC Survey Instrument .................................................................................. 67
Survey Pre-test .......................................................................................... 71
Institutional Review Board consent .......................................................... 72
Data collection .......................................................................................... 72
Questions and hypotheses ......................................................................... 73
Dependent variables .................................................................................. 74
Explanatory variables ................................................................................ 75
Coding and analysis of data ...................................................................... 76
Bootstrapping ................................................................................................... 77
IV. RESULTS ................................................................................................................ 79
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 79
Validity and Reliability .................................................................................... 80
Survey Results .................................................................................................. 81
Demographic characterization of counties by population size ................. 81
Characterization of LEPC service areas ................................................... 83
Characterization of LEPC membership .................................................... 84
LEPC membership numbers and meeting frequency ................................ 86
LEPC member training, staffing, and funding/support ............................. 88
 ix 
LEPC outcomes: Emergency plans and member familiarity .................... 90
LEPC outcomes: Emergency plan exercises and accident experience ..... 92
LEPC priorities and resources .................................................................. 95
Impact of recent disasters on LEPC activity ............................................. 98
LEPC proactive efforts and familiarity ..................................................... 99
Compliance and proactivity levels .......................................................... 100
Bootstrapping and Correlation Analysis ........................................................ 102
V. CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................... 111
Introduction .................................................................................................... 111
Summary of Research Results and Results of Hypothesis Tests ................... 112
Hypothesis testing ................................................................................... 113
Hypothesis 1a .............................................................................. 114
Hypothesis 1b.............................................................................. 114
Hypothesis 2a .............................................................................. 114
Hypothesis 2b.............................................................................. 114
Hypothesis 3a .............................................................................. 115
Hypothesis 3b.............................................................................. 115
Hypothesis 4a .............................................................................. 115
Hypothesis 4b.............................................................................. 115
Other findings ......................................................................................... 116
Proactivity ............................................................................................... 117
Theoretical and Practitioner Implications ...................................................... 118
Limitations of This Study and Threats to the Validity of Inferences ............. 124
 x 
Recommendations for Future Research ......................................................... 125
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 126
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................ 133
A. LIST OF ACRONYMS ...................................................................................... 134
B. LEPC SURVEY .................................................................................................. 135


















LIST OF TABLES 
1. List of LEPC Representatives ..................................................................................4
2. Starik et al. (2000) factors to determine compliance and proactivity level of 
LEPCs ....................................................................................................................16
3. Principles to control for validity when looking for probative causal 
connections ............................................................................................................62
4. Compliance Index Factors .....................................................................................65
5. Proactivity Index Factors .......................................................................................66
6. Variables, Research Questions, and Survey Items.................................................68
7. Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables .......................................................80
8. Total Variance Explained by Principle Component Analysis ...............................81
9. Population Size Served by LEPCs .........................................................................82
10. Characterization of LEPC Service Areas or “Urban-ness” ....................................83
11. Representative Organizations Participating in LEPCs ..........................................84
12. LEPC Sample Membership and Meeting Attendance ...........................................86
13. LEPC meeting frequency .......................................................................................87
14. LEPC Paid Staff .....................................................................................................88
15. Sources of LEPC Operating Budgets .....................................................................89
16. Emergency Response Plan Exercise ......................................................................91
17. How LEPCs are Exercising Their Emergency Plans .............................................93
18. Number of Chemical Accidents within Last Five Years .......................................94
19. Activities prioritized by LEPCs within the past year .............................................97
20. LEPC Activity Post 9/11/01...................................................................................98
 xii 
21. LEPC Familiarity with Proactive terminology & incorporation into Mission 
Statement................................................................................................................99
22. Compliance and Proactivity Scores of Respondent LEPCs .................................101
23. Spearman’s Rank Correlation for Tested Hypotheses .........................................103
24. Cross-tabulation of Compliance scores by Number of Regulated Facilities 
in Jurisdictions .....................................................................................................104
25. Cross-Tabulation of Compliance Score and Population Size ..............................105
26. Cross-Tabulation of Proactivity Score and Population Size ................................106
27. Cross-Tabulation of Staff Funding and Number of Chemical Accidents in 
Previous Year .......................................................................................................108
28. Cross-Tabulation of Funding For Staff and Number of Facilities within a 
Jurisdiction ...........................................................................................................109










LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  SARA III Model for Emergency Management (adapted from 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/RAV/conf/IDRiM07/Papers/Lindell.pdf). .......6
Figure 2.  Preparedness Cycle (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2011) ............26
Figure 3.  Emergency Management Approaches overlayed on Functional Areas 
(adapted from Zingale, 2008) ............................................................................27








“Across the country, more than 15,000 facilities report to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency that they use large amounts of extremely 
hazardous chemicals. The law requires these facilities to disclose potential 
chemical accidents, from the most-likely emergencies to a worst-case 
scenario. Despite reporting large vulnerability zones and populations at risk, 
few chemical-using plants have announced measurable goals or timelines to 
reduce the size of the area at risk from a potential worst-case chemical fire 
or spill.”  
--The Working Group on Community Right to Know (2004) 
Background 
 In the United States, and throughout the developed world, millions of factories, 
chemical facilities, and transportation highways store or convey extremely hazardous 
substances (EHS).  These substances can be found in proximity to heavily populated 
residential and commercial areas either at storage facilities or via transportation routes. 
Areas where we live, work, and our children go to school are within a stones throw of 
“threshold” quantities of EHS, yet we are generally unaware or unconcerned with just 
how close we are to these known chemical hazards (Kay County Local Emergency 
Planning Committee 2010). The threat of these hazards is real, and the potential for 
disaster is a serious matter. Public health and safety has become an issue of importance as 
the complexities and complications of the global community become better understood. 
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Public safety has also increased in salience in the United States in particular since the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina devastation in 
New Orleans. More recently, the earthquakes in Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, and 
most notably Japan have refocused efforts worldwide on examining policies and practices 
surrounding disaster management and response. In addition, providing long-term, 
sustainable solutions rather than short-term fixes is an important consideration as society 
creates and manages problems with long-ranging consequences. 
 As a response to these disasters, the Federal government has implemented 
measures to attempt to ensure continued public safety including a mandate for the 
development of local disaster planning. Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) 
were created in 1987 to address disasters involving extremely hazardous chemicals 
(EHS) at a local level, using local knowledge. By some, the development of LEPCs are 
another government attempt to “shift and shaft” an unfunded mandate on already over-
taxed localities (O'Leary, 1995).  Much of the work done by LEPCs is completed on an 
unpaid, voluntary basis. Committees have either no or extremely limited funding. For 
others, this novel approach to disaster planning is seen as a positive way to involve 
stakeholders and inform the public of hazards in “their backyard”.  The informed public, 
in turn, are theoretically to respond by demanding change from their local legislators, 
resulting in a bottom-up sort of regulation.  In order for this stakeholder-based system of 
disaster management to function as intended, informing and educating the public is a 
critical step.  Without information and access, the public is unable to address accident/ 
exposure risk within their community.  
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 Information is to be made accessible to the public by LEPCs in several ways. 
Information is primarily made public through the provision of Material Safety Data 
Sheets (MSDS), detailing quantities and specific hazards of EHS stored and used at 
nearby facilities. Secondly, publicly announced meetings are to be held to discuss hazards 
and disaster planning and management. These forums are intended to provide 
transparency and public inclusion in disaster planning.  
 To place the development of LEPCs within the historical context of the American 
environmental movement, the researcher will provide a brief historical overview. The 
environmental movement of the 1970’s led to far-reaching and historic changes in 
American environmental policy. This spanned from the creation of the USEPA and the 
first Earth Day in 1970 to the development of water, air, and land pollution legislation 
over the next few decades that required industry to change how they do business and 
work to clean up past mistakes. Companies that did not meet newly set environmental 
quality standards were fined or otherwise penalized. This “command and control” style 
policy resulted in sweeping reductions in human health hazards (such as lead in gasoline) 
and environmental pollution (such as new heavy metal pollution entering rivers and 
streams). The political and economic policy of the 1980’s that followed, under then-
President Reagan, was less favorable towards environmental regulation and represented a 
political swing towards the reduction of the regulatory burden on corporations overall.  
 The environment was stuck between a figurative “rock and a hard place”; between 
those who felt that regulation wasn’t doing enough and environmental clean-up efforts 
were too slow, and those who felt that too much time and money was being spent on what 
was considered as needless environmental regulation. The demands of big business 
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clashed with efforts to clean up the toxic environmental legacy of the industrial 
revolution and further development. LEPCs were created during this tumultuous time in 
U.S. environmental policy.   
In 1987, Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) were created as a step 
towards addressing recognized chemical hazards in a democratic, collaborative fashion. 
LEPCs bring together local stakeholders and representative parties to develop decision-
making and planning processes for managing and responding to catastrophic 
emergencies. LEPC members represent stakeholders and community members such as 
firefighters, hospital personnel and environmentalists (see Table 1 for complete list), who 
together decide how best to manage known community hazards. In addition, LEPCs work 
to advocate for reduction of hazards within their jurisdiction. 
Table 1.  
List of LEPC Representatives  
LEPC Representative Membership  
State elected officials Environmental groups 
Local elected officials Transportation officials 
Police Hospital officials 
Firefighters Regulated facility representatives 
Civil defense Community groups 
Public health professionals Local media  
 
Legislative Background 
 In the 1970’s, American attention was focused on addressing and managing 
chemical and natural disasters piecemeal, as they occurred. Governors, politicians, and 
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others were concerned with the lack of a national comprehensive policy or plan for 
managing disasters. In 1979, the creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) was created, along with the 1979 publication of the text: Comprehensive 
Emergency Management-A Governor's Guide. This was the first document to introduce 
the idea of “comprehensive emergency management.” It focused on four primary 
functional areas, which continue to be important in all emergency management 
approaches today: mitigation, preparedness, recovery, and response. Comprehensive 
emergency management (CEM) was an important historic pillar of present day 
emergency management in that it categorized emergency management (EM) into 
functional areas and worked to identify the primary activities necessary to the tasks.  
 In 1985, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) created the 
National Emphasis Program, which focused attention on practices and procedures for 
chemical safety and security in large manufacturing plants (Gray, 2002). Shortly after, 
EPA augmented the OSHA program with the Chemical Emergency Preparedness 
Program (CEPP), which was a purely voluntary program to provide information to 
concerned localities about air pollutants in their area (Gray, 2001). During this time, 
states and localities were organizing a series of right-to-know plans on their own, with 
around 30 states and/or metropolitan areas requiring information from industry by 1986 
(Gray, 2002).  
 In 1986, the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA), 
under Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA III) 
mandated the creation of the first LEPCs (Emergency Planning and Community Right to 
Know Act, 1986).  EPCRA was created to enhance and support CEPP by unifying the 
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legal patchwork of state and local programs and practices responsible for mitigating 
chemical spills and providing information to the public. LEPCs were created to 
encourage stakeholder and community participation in the emergency planning process 
(such as in the event of a chemical accident), and are comprised of a diverse range of 
representatives of stakeholder groups within each county jurisdiction. Figure 1 shows the 
theoretical emergency management model that SARA III was intended to articulate.  
 
 
Figure 1.  SARA III Model for Emergency Management (adapted from 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/RAV/conf/IDRiM07/Papers/Lindell.pdf). 
  
 EPCRA was the United States’ federal response to concerns about chemical 
safety and security after several devastating incidents involving exposure to hazardous 
chemicals. The first was a 1984 Union Carbide chemical accident in Bhopal, India, which 
killed an estimated 3,800 people and permanently injured thousands more (Union 
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Carbide Corporation, 2001).  A few months after the Bhopal accident, a similar, though 
much smaller scale, accident occurred involving methyl isocyanate again at a Union 
Carbide pesticide facility in Kanawah Valley, West Virginia.   
 When implementing EPCRA, states were given the freedom to interpret the word 
“local” in the means best fitting their state. As such, the implementation of EPCRA varies 
on a state by state basis, as some states interpreted the law into the creation of county-
level LEPCs, others developed the groups based on densely-populated areas (such as 
metropolitan urban areas), or the recommendations of local industry. Ohio chose to base 
its LEPCs at the county-level.  
 Further legislation has been developed since this time addressing hazardous 
materials security issues.  This includes the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the 2007 
development of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards. These rules address 
risk-based performance standards, including the development of Security Vulnerability 
Assessments, along with the creation and implementation of Site Security Plans for 
vulnerable facilities. While important, these newer rules focus on mitigation and security, 
and do not address the underlying vulnerability inherent in possessing and storing large 
quantities of extremely hazardous substances.  
 It is interesting to note that the U.S. legislative attempt at managing chemical 
disasters is novel when compared with the framework set out to manage natural disasters. 
Natural disasters, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, etc. are primarily handled from a 
national or “top-down” level by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 
Local organizations, including LEPCs, are provided with the tools to locally plan for 
these situations, but local organizations are in general not the primary decision-makers 
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and planners for managing natural catastrophes when they occur. In general, natural 
disaster planning is not handled in as democratic or stakeholder-inclusive a process as is 
chemical disaster planning.  
 LEPCs are unique in that they are intended to incorporate citizen-participants in 
the planning process. EPCRA, the legislation responsible for LEPCs, was described by 
Goldman (1991) as “what may be the most important advance in U.S. information policy 
since the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).” This represents a shift in policy from 
“command and control” style environmental regulation with its agency-heavy, top-down 
approach at setting and enforcing regulations to a more participatory, public-mediated, 
democratic approach to managing regulation locally. As illustrated in Figure 1, EPCRA 
was built on the idea that local stakeholders would “step up” and take responsibility for 
managing risk by lobbying their legislatures, once the hazard information was made 
available to them.  
 This has also been described as a transformation from direct regulation of 
environmental problems to “informational regulation” (Kleindorfer & Orts, 1998). Case 
(2001) also suggests that this more participatory regulation is an excellent addition to 
traditional “command and control” regulation by improving efficiency and flexibility in a 
cost-effective manner. There is some evidence to back up these claims. Santos et al. 
(1996) found improvement in production processes and increased communication and 
cost-effectiveness amongst regulated industry as a response to SARA III implementation.  
 The Toxics Release Inventory Program (TRI), also created under EPCRA, 
collects information in a database on nearly 700 toxic chemicals released or disposed of 
in communities throughout the United States (http://www.epa.gov/tri/). This information 
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is available to the public on USEPA’s website, and can be searched by zipcode. Despite 
some of the accuracy issues known to TRI data (Bowen et al., 1995), it is still some of the  
best available aggregate information we have to date. That being said, quantities of TRI 
emissions decreased by more than 45% between the year 1988 (after the implementation 
of EPCRA) and the year 1995. Public pressure, or informational regulation, is argued to 
be effective, whether it takes the form of stock valuations of publicly traded companies 
after release of TRI data (Konar and Cohen, 1997) or public company surveys (Santos, 
Covellos, and McCallum, 1996). The “fear of embarrassment” became the biggest reality 
for many companies subject to the new EPCRA rule (Wolf, 1996; Templeton and Kirk, 
2008). Wolf (1996) argues that access to TRI data by environmental groups, government 
agencies, mass media, and industry itself forced the regulated industries towards 
voluntary reform.  
 The toxic chemicals regulated under EPCRA are called extremely hazardous 
substances (EHS). EHS are defined and categorized by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA), and specifically identified and regulated in Chapter 40 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations (40 CFR part 355). These chemicals are considered to be 
extremely hazardous when housed, transported or moved above threshold planning 
quantities (TPQ) (USEPA, 2009).  TPQ is the quantity of a substance that triggers 
reporting requirements to the USEPA. In other words, when a substance is stored or used 
in a specified amount considered hazardous, for example at or above 500 pounds, it must 
be reported to local government authorities to facilitate emergency planning. The amount 
varies by substance type (the actual chemical) and form (solid, liquid gas). The only 
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industry regulated under EPCRA is that with TPQ of EHS. There are thousands of small 
firms housing EHS in combinations and quantities less than TPQ that go unregulated. 
 The potential threat to communities’ basic health and safety posed by proximity to 
large quantities of EHS is being managed by EPCRA . Many facilities, however, that 
either store or manufacture large quantities of extremely hazardous chemicals are situated 
within close proximity to residential neighborhoods, schools and businesses. Most, if not 
all, communities have highways and railroads that run through them where hazardous 
materials are transported nearby on a regular basis. Even if the terrorist threat to these 
communities is never realized, the risk to both human health and the natural environment 
from “normal” or inevitable accidents and chemical spills is statistically unavoidable over 
the long term (Perrow, 1984).   
 The term “normal accident” was coined by Perrow to describe specific situations 
under a narrow series of high-risk conditions that include tight coupling, interactive 
complexity, and sometimes operator error (1984). “Interactive complexity” refers 
specifically to instances where there are multiple layers of complexity within a system 
with consequences and results that we cannot accurately predict given our current 
understanding and modeling limitations (Marais, Dulac, & Leveson, 2004). These are 
frequently the circumstances under which EHS are held. Under these conditions, Perrow 
defines components of tightly coupled systems as those that have rapid and profound 
impact on each other, in which case intervention may only function to further complicate 
problems rather than solve them. This tight coupling is complicated further by inherent 
interactive complexity within the defined system.  Interactive complexity is defined as 
conditions in a system in which the presence of several individual, unrelated or “discrete” 
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failures would result in further unforeseen complications. In plain English, this means 
that the complexity is the result of the interaction of two or more unrelated processes in a 
system. This type of complexity can be seen as inherent within the system, as it is 
intrinsic or essential within the process.  
 All these characteristics (tight coupling, interactive complexity, and operator 
error) in an unpredictable, technologically complicated system can lead to the 
development of normal accidents. “The old parable about the kingdom lost because of a 
thrown horseshoe has its parallel in many normal accidents: the initiating event is often, 
taken by itself, seemingly quite trivial. Because of the system's complexity and tight 
coupling, however, events cascade out of control to create a catastrophic outcome” 
(Piccard, 2005). The most common and obvious example of such a situation may be a 
nuclear energy facility. Very small errors can quickly spiral “out of control” in such 
environments, resulting in unforeseen consequences, even when the best attempts at 
controlling for such errors are taken into account. It is for this reason that in addition to 
attempting to control for errors and create safety checks in complex situations, it is also 
prudent to strive towards actions that reduce inherent hazards themselves. 
Hazard Reduction Activity 
Hazard reduction activities are sometimes described by the term, “Inherent 
safety”. The idea of inherent safety has been advocated in the United Kingdom (UK) 
since a 1974 factory disaster in Flixborough, Britain (Kletz, 1996).  A caprolactam (a 
precursor to nylon) manufacturing plant in the small village of Flixborough, Britain 
exploded June 1, 1974, killing 28 and injuring 36 more. Nearby villages as far as eight 
miles away were structurally damaged from the blast, and it took more than ten days to 
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control the resultant fires. Out of this experience, the concept of inherent safety became 
publicly salient in the UK as a means of trying to prevent, rather than mitigate, future 
catastrophes. Inherent safety may include a variety of different activities, including 
intensification, substitution, attenuation, limitation of effects, and simplifying (Mannan, 
Rogers et al. 2003).   
Intensification is the simple reduction of the quantity of hazardous chemicals 
stored/ housed at the chemical plant. Substitution involves the use of a less harmful 
substance in place of a hazardous one. Attenuation means working with chemical(s) 
under less severe conditions, such as a reduced temperature or pressure. Limitation of 
effects results from a move towards safer facility design or process conditions, rather than 
potentially faulty process safety controls. Finally, facilities that are simpler are far less 
likely to experience failures than plants that are complex in design, structure and process. 
LEPCs may help reduce hazards by aiding facilities in the performance of 
inherent safety opportunity audits, which point out opportunities for chemical facilities to 
use inherently safer means; by providing educational materials to facilities on the benefits 
of reducing hazards, and/or by awarding hazard reduction steps through public relations 
recognition or other approaches.  
Context Within Which LEPCs Operate 
 Since 2001, LEPCs have been given a greater role in carrying out terrorist 
prevention activities by helping to facilitate the application of homeland security 
legislation on a local level. LEPCs were originally created with a range of responsibilities 
surrounding the response to and management of chemical disasters. Their mandated tasks 
include providing information to the public through community right-to-know requests, 
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collecting data for annual chemical inventories for facilities within each jurisdiction 
through reporting on Materials Safety Data Sheets (MSDS), conducting disaster drills, 
and working under the supervision of the State Emergency Planning Commission 
(SERC) and the State Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and in conjunction with 
county Emergency Management Agencies (EMA) to create local emergency plans 
(USEPA, 2011).  
  In many cases, LEPCs work in tandem with area organizations and neighboring 
LEPCs in order to develop emergency plans and practice drills that more accurately 
reflect the nature of true EHS emergencies. As the EHS don’t respect jurisdictional 
boundaries, adequate emergency planning must take this into account and allow for 
cross-cooperation and coordination between adjacent areas. There is evidence of LEPCs 
acting cooperatively with each other and with other nearby agencies towards emergency 
planning and management (Franklin County EMA, 2010; Gablehouse, 2007; Templeton 
& Kirk, 2008).   
Statement of Research Question: 
There are 2 main questions that will be addressed by this research: 
 How compliant and proactive are LEPCs, measured using Starik et al.’s 
(2000) Compliance-Proactivity index? 
 What contextual factors are correlated with the compliance and proactivity 
scores of LEPCs? 
This project was designed to explore the compliance and proactivity of LEPCs, 
and to examine these factors in relation to selected criteria that vary amongst groups.  If 
one were to imagine LEPC compliance on a one-dimensional plane, it would extend from 
groups that are essentially not compliant, not functioning or defunct (fulfilling less than 
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five of the requirements developed by Starik et al., 2000). LEPCs classified in this group 
are not in compliance with state regulations or federal law. 
Starik et al.’s (2000) second category consists of groups that are “mostly 
compliant”, i.e., they adequately meet some or most of their legislative and regulatory 
goals (those meeting 5-6 requirements listed). These LEPCs meet the majority of the 
statutory requirements listed in EPCRA and the state regulatory requirements. This 
category will follow requirements set out in the Ohio Revised Code and the Ohio 
Administrative Code (ORC and OAC Ch. 3750.) This includes the creation of a local 
emergency plan, in conjunction with the county EMA, which must be approved by a 
majority of county LEPC members, and revised and updated annually by October 17. The 
plan must also be coordinated with those of adjoining planning districts. Emergency 
plans must be approved by SERC or are subject to revision requirements. If emergency 
planning requirements aren’t met by LEPCs, 50% of the planning portion of SERC’s 
grant funding to the LEPC will be cut. If there are no changes, an LEPC can submit a “no 
change” letter to the state in lieu of an updated plan. 
These “mostly compliant” LEPCs also regularly perform emergency exercises, 
which consist of tabletop drills, functional drills, and full-scale drills. Exercises are 
performed by each county on a four-year rotation, with the current rotation being from 
2010-2013. Each four-year cycle is expected to contain one of each of the above types of 
exercises with at minimum one exercise occurring annually. Two actual incidents may be 
substituted for exercises within a four-year cycle if they fit criteria listed within the OAC. 
An LEPC’s annual hazardous materials exercise can be combined with a County 
Emergency Management Agency (EMA) exercise, but must still comply with all of the 
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SERC’s exercise rules and requirements. Each exercise must involve either a “fixed 
extremely hazardous substances facility” or a “transporter of regulated chemical cargo,” 
and can include any chemicals designated as “extremely hazardous” under OAC 3750-
081.  
 Finally, the third category stipulated by Starik at al. (2000) includes groups that 
are “compliant”, fulfilling seven to nine requirements on the compliance scale (See Table 
2). 
In addition to the Compliance Scale, there is a Proactivity Scale, which examines 
some of the activities that might be seen by an LEPC working towards hazard reduction, 
accident and/or pollution prevention, and related activities. Groups were categorized one 
of three ways on this scale: very proactive if they fulfilled five or more factors, somewhat 
proactive if they fulfilled at least three factors, and not proactive if they completed zero 
factors (Starik et al., 2000).  
The proactive factors encourage the use of accident prevention or mitigation 
techniques through conventional or secondary means. These are means of preventing and 
controlling accidents through containment methods, control systems, and prevention 
methods that do not remove or reduce inherent hazard of materials or processes.   
 
                                                 
1 A complete list of more than 3,000 chemicals regulated under EPCRA is available at EPA’s 
website at the following address: 
http://www.epa.gov/osweroe1/docs/chem/list_of_lists_revised_7_26_2011.pdf.  This “list of 
lists” includes all chemicals regulated under EPCRA sections 302 and 313, and those regulated 
under the Clean Air Act section 112(r) for accidental air release.  
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Table 2.  
Starik et al. (2000) factors to determine compliance and proactivity level of LEPCs.2 
Compliance Factors Proactivity Factors 
9 Have a chairperson 
9 Have a community emergency 
coordinator 
9 Having an information coordinator 
9 Holding regular meetings 
9 Advertising meetings to the public 
9 Developing and emergency response 
plan (ERP)  
9 Submitting ERP it to the SERC 
9 Publishing newspaper notice about 
availability of ERC 
9 Reviewing the plan in the past year 
 
¾ Meeting quarterly or more often 
¾ Making informed hazard reduction, 
accident prevention, or pollution 
prevention recommendations to 
industry/ local government 
¾ Incorporating or having a strategy 
to incorporate risk management 
information (RMP) into ERP within 
the year* 
¾ Updating the plan within the past 
year 
¾ Practicing the plan within the past 
year 
¾ Incorporates “proactive” terms in 
mission statement** 
 
 *RMPs are now “commonplace” and no longer an indicator of proactive engagement 
** Not a part of previously developed assessment 
 
LEPC support of these practices may come in a variety of forms, including any of the 
following:  Operator training, accident and near-miss investigation, promotion of use of 
automatic shut-offs within facilities, secondary containment systems, deluge systems 
and/or other means to contain and maintain control of hazardous material (Greenburg, 
2006).   Chemical facilities may also reduce hazard level by changing from a less to more 
                                                 
2 The factors included in these scales aren’t scalable in a Guttman sense, as they may be 
completed in any order and any particular factor may be missing from an LEPCs tasks. Instead 
each factor included comprises one of the legislatively required steps for compliance with 
EPRCA and State regulations or additional tasks noted in the literature and in practice as 
“proactive” steps, respectively. 
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stable state of a hazardous input material (e.g. liquid or solid vs. gas), storing a smaller 
quantity of a hazardous material onsite, altering the temperature or pressure under which 
the hazardous material is used, and/or substituting a safer input material. LEPCs may 
foster such behavior on the part of industry, through the use of incentive programs, 
awards, and information or training. Inclusion of proactive terms in the LEPC mission 
statement was added by this researcher as an additional measure of LEPC commitment to 
proactive or hazard-reduction activities. 
Objectives of Research and Significance 
 In general, the intent of this study is to identify and compare compliance and 
proactivity in local emergency planning committees, along with examining factors that 
are related to variations in compliance and proactivity. More proactive emergency 
planning may result in reduced risk to the public, through either efforts to reduce hazard 
levels, or better and more effective planning for accidents. There are three primary 
objectives. The first is to increase knowledge of emergency planning amongst researchers 
and academics, along with improved conceptualization of the definition of what makes an 
“effective,” “compliant,” and “proactive” LEPC in the literature. Secondly, this research 
will provide a “snapshot” of the activities of working LEPCs along with insight into the 
effectiveness and functionality of emergency planning, nearly 25 years after its inception 
as a nationally organized activity. Thirdly, this study will also examine whether LEPCs 
are fulfilling their legislatively intended function of informing the public. If the intention 
of EPCRA was to regulate the chemical industry by providing public access to data on 
chemicals in their neighborhood, this is a critical component of their mandated task. 
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 LEPCs in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have been the subject of 
published research studies. This is the first study the author is aware of to focus on a 
sample in the state of Ohio. USEPA has completed three nationwide surveys of LEPCs, 
which have been primarily practitioner surveys, without theoretical or statistical analysis 
beyond frequencies and cross-tabulations. This research study will take a unique 
approach by examining emergency planning by LEPCs on a sample in Ohio and looking 
for relationships between the respective levels of compliance and proactivity, and 
demographic and other factors. Are more compliant LEPCs located in more urban, 
populous counties? Are more proactive LEPCs those that have had more first-hand 
experience with accidents? Is the level of compliance and proactivity in the Ohio LEPC 
sample similar to that of LEPCs in the United States overall?  
  To the author’s knowledge, a comprehensive examination of Ohio’s LEPCs has 
not been performed prior to this, and the results will provide practical information to both 
state and local entities in addition to the academic community.  Comparison of this 
study’s results with those of nationwide LEPC research will help determine the 
generalizability of this study. There is at this point, no known reason to presuppose the 
results in Ohio would be any different than nationwide averages for LEPC compliance 
and proactivity. 
 If insight can be obtained into the relationship between compliance or proactivity 
and demographics such as county population size, urbanization of county, or hazard or 
accident experience, it might be possible to eventually develop a prescriptive or best 
practices approach to improve emergency planning. It is unknown at this point whether 
counties with more proactive LEPCs are “safer” from the perspective of less hazard or 
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fewer accidents. The researcher is hopeful that a clear relationship might exist between 
the active work of LEPCs and safer, more informed communities, as this was the intent 
of the legislation that created them. Inclusion of local stakeholders in an open, transparent 
forum is an American ideal of democracy in action. Emergency planning, within this 
framework, is intended to promote buy-in into an environment that communities can 
agree upon as safe and equitable.  
 This research will use correlation methodologies to examine the relationship 
between variables. An established scale is used to determine variation in a range of 
factors.  This exploration applies a strategic framework to empirically identify factors 
related to why some LEPCs are more proactive and/or compliant than others. The factors 





LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY 
“What you don't have can't leak." 
-Trevor Kletz 
 
Preface to Literature Review 
At the outset of this study, the researcher began with an interest in the 
Precautionary Principle (PP).  Like sustainability, there are many definitions and 
constructions of the PP in the literature, but one of the most commonly referred to 
definitions comes from the Wingspread Conference on Precaution. The Wingspread 
Conference on the Precautionary Principle was a 1998 meeting of academics, treaty 
negotiators, environmentalists, and activists to discuss the use of the PP in environmental 
and health public policy decisions (http://www.sehn.org/wing.html, 1998). An excerpt 
from the Wingspread Statement defines the PP as follows:  
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the 
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause 
and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. In this 
context the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the 
burden of proof. The process of applying the Precautionary Principle must 
be open, informed and democratic and must include potentially affected 
parties. It must also involve an examination of the full range of 
alternatives, including no action (http://www.sehn.org/wing.h-tml, 1998). 
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With this in mind, the researcher began conversations with faculty, discussions 
with fellow graduate students, and a review of the literature in relevant fields. This led to 
an investigation into the application of the PP in the hazardous chemical industry; that is 
the idea of Inherent Safety. Inherent safety is a concept that applies to reducing the 
quantity, quality, or character of hazards, rather than the mitigation of risk from hazard. 
This is an idea that has gained traction in some areas of EHS use. Further research led to 
an interest in Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) as organizations that are 
in some instances actively working to implement or promote the use of Inherent safety 
concepts, a priori the PP. Phone and in-person conversations were undertaken with LEPC 
practitioners and experts at other Universities. It became apparent that there is a range of 
activity level amongst LEPCs, potentially due to funding, experience, or location 
differences, among others. In the interest of reducing repetition, the terms “inherent 
safety”, “proactive”, and “precautionary” will be used interchangeably with the same 
meaning throughout this literature review.  
 As a brief review, LEPCs are primarily volunteer-run county-level organizations 
that were created under mandate in 1987 by SARA Title III. Their purpose was 
principally to manage the collection and dissemination of information about local 
chemical hazards, including TRI data. In addition, they are required to develop, practice, 
and test an emergency plan regularly in case of a chemical disaster.  Anecdotal evidence 
and objective research shows variation in LEPC performance between jurisdictions 
within a state, and between states. One potential source of this variation may be funding 
differences between groups. Adequate financial support for managing disasters 
effectively is still lacking in emergency management programs according to Waugh 
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(Waugh 2000; Waugh 2007). While some LEPCs are essentially unfunded, others are 
able to secure more funding, increasing their capacity for effectiveness. Organizational 
capacity is a well-known antecedent to organizational effectiveness (Misener and 
Doherty, 2009).  
The literature also points towards other factors as potential reasons for variation 
as well. The current body of knowledge about Local Emergency Planning Committees 
(LEPCs) focuses on effectiveness, and specifically on how LEPCs are performing 
relative to their stated mission. Relevant areas within the body of LEPC knowledge will 
be discussed as they contribute and relate to this research. Six central themes will be 
addressed in this literature review, including:  2.1 general review of emergency planning 
history and research, 2.1 informational regulation, 2.2 organizational theory and LEPC 
effectiveness, 2.3 disaster management frameworks, 2.4 compliance and proactivity, 2.5 
theoretical presuppositions, 2.6 questions and hypotheses. 
Emergency Planning 
 Researchers in various fields have studied emergency planning and hazardous 
chemical management. This chapter will include a brief overview of the study of 
emergency planning and hazardous chemical mitigation within several bodies of 
literature. A proportion of the literature available is also practitioner-oriented, as 
emergency management is a practical, evidence-based and results-driven field.  
The origins of emergency planning as a field of study rest in the environmental 
policy literature.  The environmental policy literature portrays an evolution of 
environmental regulation from “command and control” or “standards and enforcement” 
style regulation in early U.S. environmental legislation, to more “participatory 
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regulation”. Beginning with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (NEPA), 
environmental regulation took the format of rules and standards set by the EPA for 
pollution control, followed by enforcement by the government agency to ensure 
compliance. While there was marked success with this strategy (e.g. cleaner water, lead 
removal from gasoline, removal of Chloroflourocarbons [CFC’s] from products), it 
wasn’t always effective or popular as the political climate evolved in the 1980’s. Experts 
complained that command and control regulation didn’t offer economic incentive options 
(more carrot, less stick), and that it required too much of government to specify 
appropriate means and technologies to manage highly complicated pollutants and 
processes (Rosenbaum 1998).  
One of the primary foci of emergency or disaster planning is management of 
EHS. Although there are as of 2012, more than a dozen laws enforced by the EPA 
regarding EHS in the U.S. including the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Clean Railroads 
Act of 2008, the Hazardous Materials Transportation and Uniform Safety Act 
(HMTUSA), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA), and the Chemical Facilities Security Act (CFSA), 
 [M]ost of these laws are burdened by the daunting variety of materials to 
be regulated, by inadequate data on the distribution and effect of these 
substances on humans and the environment, by political and 
administrative impediments to implementation, and by widespread public 
criticism and distrust (Rosenbaum, 1998, p. 224). 
  
In addition to market-based mechanisms as economic incentives, EPCRA was a bold step 
towards more participatory-based regulation. According to Goldman (1991, p.20-1) 
EPCRA “may be the most important advance in U.S. public information policy since the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)… [and has] evolved within the larger historical 
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context of increasing pressures to democratize American regulatory processes.” The 
development and contribution of voluntary regulatory processes is an important step in 
the history of emergency management as it shows a noteworthy shift in the regulatory 
framework.  
Out of this historical precedent, EPCRA was amended to create LEPCs and the 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). This was an important step towards what has been 
described as “informational regulation”(Kleindorfer and Orts 1998). Informational 
regulation provides environmental information directly to local entities and citizens, 
promoting a more efficient, cost-effective, bottom-up approach (Case 2001). This is in 
direct contrast to previous “top down” models of command-and-control style 
environmental regulation. 
Implementation of EPCRA mandated the creation of LEPCs along with 
supporting state level organizations, along with a series of criteria to fulfill the role of 
emergency preparedness in case of natural or man-made disaster. Compliance with these 
legislative mandates is complicated, at times tricky, and generally minimally funded or 
unfunded (O’Leary, 1995). The burden of implementation has been left at the local 
government level, without adequate financial support for the task. How this task has been 
managed will be discussed, along with the shifting emphasis and need for different types 
of emergency planning in a post 9/11 “homeland security” environment.  
While a fair amount of research has been done on emergency response to natural 
disasters, research on response to chemical and man-made disaster is a growing field. 
Humanity’s intensive development and use of hazardous materials and chemicals is 
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arguably a field most rapidly developed in the post-World War II era. Inevitably, any 
study of disaster management unfolded from necessity out of this newer field.  
Tierney, Lindell, and Perry state that more research is needed to characterize the 
structure of local emergency preparedness networks (2001). It isn’t completely clear how 
some factors, such as funding, personnel, community interest or use of technology 
influence preparedness. Why do different emergency management agencies vary in their 
approaches to emergency preparedness and choose to emphasize one particular planning 
strategy over another? The topic is still being explored, and is constantly evolving due to 
changing legislative requirements and demands on over-strapped localities.  
Disaster Management Frameworks 
The primary frameworks in the disaster management literature are examined as 
context for the functionality of LEPCs. There are two connected literature streams laid 
out concerning disaster management. The first is “foundational” concepts and 
frameworks discussed in the development of the field of disaster management. This 
historical component is an important stepping-stone towards more contemporary disaster 
management. Contemporary disaster management approaches include those more 
currently being debated in the literature. There is not clear consensus as to the best use of 
emergency planners extremely limited resources.  
 First a brief definition of each of the four functional areas of emergency 
management is introduced below. Mitigation is “sustained action taken to reduce or 
eliminate long-term risk to people and their property from hazards and their effects” 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency 2011). Mitigation can be thought of like 
insurance. The second functional area of emergency management is preparedness. 
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Preparedness (see Figure 2) is defined by the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) as “ a continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, 
evaluating, and taking corrective action in an effort to ensure effective coordination 
during incident response” (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2011).  
 
Figure 2.  Preparedness Cycle (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2011) 
 
Response is the third functional area of emergency management. The Department of 
Homeland Security (2008) defines response as “ immediate actions to save lives, protect 
property and the environment, and meet basic human needs. Response also includes the 
execution of emergency plans and actions to support short term recovery”. Finally, 
recovery is the activities undertaken by communities and individuals to return to 
“normal” after a disaster or incident occurs. This might include activities such as 
obtaining financial assistance, physical clean-up of affected areas, and other remediation 
steps.  
 A framework can be thought of as a basic conceptual structure or system of ideas, 
underlying a theory or notion. The field of emergency planning has developed several 
distinct research frameworks with which to examine disaster planning and mitigation.  
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Some of the earliest discussions of disasters in the literature were framed within three 
different approaches: natural hazards, civil defense, and comprehensive emergency 
management (CEM)/ integrated emergency management (IEM) framework.  Current 
emergency planning concepts are built on the foundation of these ideas. The more recent 
approaches include disaster resistance, disaster resilience, comprehensive emergency 
management, sustainable emergency management, and vulnerability management. Each 
of these approaches can be “plotted” over the four functional areas of emergency 
management, according to their primary focus and intention (see Fig. 3). The figure 
below visually compares the relative emphasis and focus of each contemporary 
emergency management framework within the context of the four functional areas of 
emergency management. Each framework and its position within the context of the figure 
are described in detail below. The four quadrants represent the major areas of attention 
and energy for emergency managers to direct their efforts. The focus of the groups can 
vary, which is where the different approaches noted in the literature become relevant.  
 




Foundational emergency management frameworks. The natural hazards 
framework focused on the impact of natural hazards as disasters (O’Keefe et al, 1976). 
This was problematic in that a natural disaster is not in and of itself a disaster. It is the 
when, where, and how of the event that make it potentially catastrophic. McEntire points 
out that some natural hazards, like floods, are actually environmentally beneficial (2005).  
The perspective from which the hazards are viewed in this framework is potentially self-
limiting, as it does not allow for consideration of such perspectives. Another shortcoming 
of this viewpoint is its focus only on natural hazards, not on manmade or terrorist hazards 
(McEntire, 2005).  
Alternatively, the civil defense framework bloomed from the Cold War era 
climate of “mutually assured destruction” from hostilities with the Soviet Union 
(McEntire 2005). The idea of a true Soviet threat to the American people forced cities to 
make evacuation plans for potential nuclear catastrophe. While historically important, the 
focus of this framework was often unrealistic, short-sighted, and fraught with uncertainty 
(Dynes 1994). As the name indicates, it focused primarily on emergency planning 
through the development of civil defense strategies. 
 Comprehensive emergency management (CEM) takes some of the strengths from 
the previous two frameworks and builds on them. The National Governors’ Association 
adopted CEM as its national emergency management policy in 1979 (National Governors 
Association 1979). CEM was an attempt to coordinate and integrate the various types of 
disaster management strategies and actors involved into a cohesive unit in order to 
improve response to all types of disasters (Godschalk 1991). While an improvement on 
integrating mitigation and post-disaster coordination, this framework did little to attend to 
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disaster prevention or more proactive approaches (McEntire 2005). As illustrated in 
Figure 3 above, CEM focuses primarily on the areas of recovery and response, with 
minor emphasis on preparation (as indicated by the directional arrow), and no discussion 
of disaster mitigation. The CEM approach is considered to be the last of the 
“foundational” frameworks upon which more recent disaster frameworks are based 
(McEntire 2005).  
Contemporary emergency management frameworks.   Geis (2000) claims that 
“natural disasters” such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and flooding, are often the result of 
man tampering with nature, and are therefore not “natural” by design. For example, 
coastal and riparian land development in flood zones and hurricane prone areas, and 
development on earthquake fault lines are often the sites of natural disasters. Geis’ 
implication is that if the land was undeveloped, this phenomenon would just be part of 
Earth’s natural cycles and not disastrous in consequence. As a means to mitigate natural 
disasters, he promotes the idea of the “disaster resistant community” (DRC), as designed 
by former FEMA Director James Lee Witt. This proactive policy attempts to preempt 
disasters through the use of more effective building codes and land use plans. The DRC 
was designed as an “overarching guidance that informs development in hazard prone 
areas” (Mileti 1999). Disaster resistant communities also contain adequate community 
support systems (police, fire, EMS, transportation infrastructure) for the needs of the 
community. While this may seem obvious, the widespread nature of poor planning in 
disaster prone areas, such as floodplains and coastal areas signifies our failure to fully 
embody this concept to date. The take-away idea that “(a)n appropriately designed built 
environment that is sensitive to the natural risk conditions with respect to development 
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siting and function, the provision of services, and design and construction will be more 
hazard-resistant and less vulnerable than one that is not” bears repeating (Geis 2000). 
While there is strength to the disaster resistant EM framework, Figure 3 shows it is 
incomplete as its attention is primarily on preparedness with some emphasis on 
mitigation (as indicated by the directional arrow) and little to no consideration for 
response and recovery. “A DRC represents the safest possible community that we have 
the knowledge to design and build in a natural hazard context” (Geis 2000).  The 
resistance idea infers that a community has been built and designed in an intelligent way 
so that natural hazards do not become natural disasters (Geis 2000). 
The idea of resistance held strong into the early 1990’s, but attention shifted 
towards the idea of community resilience in the latter half of the decade. The disaster 
resilience approach encompassed the more comprehensive idea of a community’s ability 
to “bounce back” from disaster, rather than only resisting it (Mileti 1999). While 
resistance was recognized as an important step towards improved community safety, the 
idea was thought to not go far enough in addressing all aspects of disasters. The idea of 
resilience shifts the focus towards more than just emergency response or risk 
management, but instead towards managing risk on a community by community basis 
and creating resilient communities (Britton and Clark 2000). The resilience approach has 
taken a particularly strong hold in disaster management in New Zealand (Britton & Clark, 
2000; McManus, Seville, Vargo, & Brunsdon, 2008). Despite its popularity, there is some 
disagreement with the above definition of resilience within the literature. Some scholars 
describe the resilience approach as more similar to the idea of hazard mitigation, 
management or planning (much like resistance) (Burby, Deyle et al. 2000), while others 
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see it emphasizing primarily community post-disaster clean-up efforts (Buckle, Mars et 
al. 2000). McManus, Seville, Vargo, and Brunsdon describe resilience as having three 
main attributes, “(s)ituation awareness, management of keystone vulnerabilities, and 
adaptive capacity” (2008). As Figure 3 shows, in this sense the disaster resilience 
concept is firmly situated in the recovery and somewhat in the response components of 
emergency management. 
Out of the context of debate between the resilience and resistance approaches, 
comes the idea of sustainable hazards management or sustainability. This approach takes 
a broader view and a longer-term perspective in an attempt to correct some of the 
weaknesses of the previous approaches (McEntire 2005). In 1987 the Brundtland 
Commission introduced the idea that “(s)ustainable development is development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). 
Mileti recognized that this idea could be extended to incorporate the needs of disaster 
planning, shifting the field’s focus still more from “hazard management” to “disaster 
management” as the two are not interchangeable (1999). A hazard is not in and of itself a 
disaster if undisturbed. A community can function completely normally with hazards in 
their midst, if properly managed. The idea of “disaster management” focuses more on 
handling situations where hazards result in accidents.  
Meo, Ziebro, and Patton describe the application of sustainability to chronic flash 
floods in Tulsa, Oklahoma (2004). The Sustainable EM approach looks at longer term 
management of hazards, and avoidance of potential disasters. As illustrated in Figure 3, 
the Sustainable EM approach emphasizes mitigation and preparedness with known and 
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calculable hazards and incorporates some thought into recovery and response plans over 
the long term (as indicated by Figure 3’s directional arrows). Through the development of 
innovative policy, including bans on floodplain building, floodplain management plans, 
and storm water management plans, amongst others, the city of Tulsa was able to take a 
longer-term approach to managing its chronic flood problem (Meo, Ziebro et al. 2004). 
This new approach dramatically reduced flash floods in Tulsa.  
The sustainability approach comes with its own nuanced strengths and 
weaknesses as well. As in any other field that the term “sustainability” is applied, there is 
still some confusion and lack of clarity as to the functional meaning for sustainability 
within the disaster management literature (McEntire and Floyd, 2003). While the 
sustainability approach has been utilized extensively in the natural hazards field (floods, 
earthquakes, etc.), it hasn’t been used broadly to address human-made or terrorist-related 
disasters, specifically those involving EHS (McEntire, 2005). In addition, issues of 
environmental health and safety are often not clear-cut or one-dimensional. Actions and 
materials helpful in disaster management (such as foams used to fight forest fires) may 
have other negative unintended environmental consequences that detract from the 
sustainability of their use (Kreimer and Munasinghe, 1991). Overlaying the concept of 
sustainability and long-term safety on top of the current political climate of homeland 
security and management of immediate risk has also proved challenging, and has reduced 
the strength and popularity of this approach.  
The final three approaches from the disaster management literature to be 
discussed are risk management, homeland security, and vulnerability. Risk management 
is a concept used in many circles, principally business and economics along with policy 
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development. Much of risk management focuses on the reduction of expected loss from 
disaster (McEntire 2005). This approach tries to take the probability of disaster into 
account as a part of the decision-making process (Mileti 1999). Risk focuses primarily on 
exactly what the name implies, managing risk. While this is a critical component to 
preparing for disaster, a critique of this approach is that it doesn’t focus enough on 
mitigation or post-disaster plans. In addition, risk management is built upon calculated 
probabilities of risk, which are not always accurate representations of reality, nor always 
calculable. How do we calculate the probability of a “worst case scenario” such as the 
catastrophic typhoon and subsequent nuclear meltdown in Japan? One additional problem 
with the risk management approach is its overemphasis on the probability of events at the 
cost of losing focus on the consequences of events (Alexander 2002).   This minimizes 
the actual discussion about processes for managing disasters and their aftermath. 
 Homeland security is a prevailing disaster management approach today due to the 
fear of terrorist attack on American soil. The terrorist attacks of 2001 changed American 
policy makers attitude from one of we’re “safe at home” to one of “constant vigilance.” 
This cultural shift is reflected in our emergency management policy and practice by 
shifting resources towards control of geographic borders, infrastructure protection, and 
attention towards our emergency response capabilities (McEntire 2005). This 
attentiveness towards securing and protecting our “homeland” has improved preventative 
and proactive efforts, hazard reduction activity, and renewed efforts securing our 
transportation infrastructure and port safety (Helmick 2008). While these shifts have been 
beneficial to these aspects of disaster management, they have focused exclusively on 
issues of terrorism, directing our limited emergency response resources on one area, to 
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the detriment of other types of disasters (i.e. earthquakes, tornadoes, forest fires, etc.) 
(Waugh 2004). This downplays not only the risk of natural hazards, but also trivializes 
the associated experts in these areas in matters of disaster management. The homeland 
security approach also minimizes some of the hard won hallmarks of emergency 
management of the last 20 years, such as cooperation, collaboration, and transparency, in 
favor of secrecy and top-down heavy-handed authoritative control (Waugh 2003). 
As emergency managers, LEPCs are expected to be attentive to all four functional 
areas of EM, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. A 2007 Working Group 
developed the following seven principles of EM. Blanchard et al. (2007) stated that 








 The vulnerability management approach has been heralded as a more “holistic, 
integrated, and balanced approach to disasters” than the previous piecemeal styles 
(McEntire 2005). McEntire also states that vulnerability management includes 
components of the risk, resistance, and resilience approaches by “work[ing] toward the 
reduction of risk and susceptibility while also raising our resistance and resilience to 
disaster” (2004). McEntire argues that when looked at on total, much of the disaster 
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research offers an unexpected measure of justification for a vulnerability management 
approach (2004). However, comprehensive vulnerability management is not inclusive of 
mitigation in its approach. As illustrated in Figure 3, this approach emphasizes the 
preparedness and response components of emergency management with less emphasis on 
recovery (as indicated by the directional arrow in Figure 3).  
Disaster management literature helps to set the historical context within which 
LEPCs and other emergency planners are functioning in the U.S.  Important as this field 
is, the primary focus is still on disaster preparedness and response/ recovery. It is possible 
to redesign the diagram in Figure 3 and re-examine the focused attention of LEPC 
activity in a different light. Figure 4 below again shows the four functional areas of 
emergency management, and the relationship between each.  
 
 




Figure 4 illustrates that there is a relationship between each of the four areas of functional 
emergency management. The top two areas of the diagram, “Mitigation” and 
“Preparedness” include activities that occur prior to an accident, while “Recovery” and 
“Response” occur after an accident has happened. The curvilinear lines represent the fact 
that emergency management is a continuous cycle, each step following the next. As 
described above in the discussion on emergency management approaches, the majority of 
emergency management resources and capacity are currently directed towards 
preparedness, recovery, and response activities, and less so towards mitigation activities. 
Precaution is included in the Mitigation area, as concepts discussed in this study inclusive 
under the heading of “Precaution” or “Inherent safety” are activities that would work to 
actually mitigate and/or eliminate hazards, rather than prepare for them.  
Informational Regulation 
The response for any hazardous event, intentional or accidental, would be first 
and primarily local (Gablehouse 2005). It is for this reason that local communities need 
to evaluate and be aware of risks. In addition, because any chemical accident has the 
potential to get out of control, and due to the human limitations of first responders in 
even the best communities, it is useful to look at accident prevention as an important 
component of risk management. The more serious a prospective accident is, the greater 
it’s potential to overwhelm first responders. LEPCs that are in a higher risk areas, either 
with greater quantity or more hazardous chemicals (e.g. combustibility, corrosiveness, 
etc.) present or those with larger populations, are hypothesized to be more likely to use a 
more proactive approach in response to this increased vulnerability. 
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An explicit responsibility of LEPCs is to develop and practice evacuation and 
emergency response plans. However, previous studies have noted that these plans are not 
adequately communicated to the public, and are only practiced annually. Even when 
emergency plans are practiced, it is difficult to simulate the extent and comprehensive-
ness of a full-scale disaster. Many events in a full-scale disaster are simply unknowable 
until the situation is at hand (Torno and Aiken County Emergency Services: Hazardous 
Materials Team 2006). This is further complicated from the fact that a large number of 
hazardous chemical events occur on highways as transportation accidents. One study 
noted that nearly 50% of accidents in Chester County, Pennsylvania occurred as fuel or 
other EHS spills on highways between 1987 and 1999 (Shorten et al., 2002).  
In addition, research indicates EHS accidents are underreported (Shorten et al., 
2002; Wendt et al., 1996). Wendt et al.’s (1996) study showed that when comparing 
results from three different reporting systems (EPA, Department of Transportation 
[DOT], and a state-run hazardous reporting system), the state-based system reported a 
greater number of incidents than either of the two Federal data collection systems. This 
was confirmed by another study in Canada, which found only 3 of 140 transportation 
accidents involving EHS present across multiple Canadian tracking databases (Trepanier, 
Leroux, & de Marcellis-Warin, 2007). 
Besides basic lack of tracking of accidents, EPCRA only requires the reporting 
and collection of data from larger companies with substantial quantities of EHS. Many 
smaller “Mom and Pop” type facilities and industries are exempt from reporting 
requirements, and therefore function “under the radar” of government oversight. The 
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underrepresentation of what may not be an insignificant EHS hazard provides a 
substantial challenge to and limitation of emergency planning and disaster response. 
LEPCs were implemented with stakeholder participation to increase community 
awareness of hazardous chemicals, with the intention that community awareness and 
increased knowledge would indirectly regulate local chemical usage. There is limited 
evidence that information disclosure to the public concerning local chemical releases is a 
successful strategy to improve chemical facility environmental performance (Graham and 
Miller 2001; Bierle 2003).  This research suggests that there has been some mild success 
on the part of emergency planners in providing information to the public, and that as a 
result, firms have reduced the quantities of hazardous materials on-site, and by extension 
their emissions (Wolf, 1996). It was suggested that provision of information to the public 
through Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) and TRI information was “regulation by 
embarrassment” (Regan, 1993, p.34). Information requests from local industry officials, 
community or the media may therefore encourage regulatory compliance and proactivity 
on the part of industry and by emergency planning agencies.  
Alternatively, there is much to suggest that community education or awareness is 
a priority not strongly acted upon by emergency planners. In one study, respondents 
stated that community awareness efforts were an area of less emphasis than technical and 
planning efforts (Rich, Conn et al. 1993). Other research shows that community right-to-
know practices are just not a priority of LEPCs (Conn, Owens et al. 1990; Rest, Krimsky 
et al. 1991; Lindell and Perry 2001) or are completely disregarded (Conn, Owens et al. 
1990; Adams, Burns et al. 1994; Starik, Adams et al. 2000). Consistently, it seems that 
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despite the regulatory intent, much of emergency planners’ limited resources are not used 
to inform the public. 
Alternatively, LEPCs can highlight the interdependence between the chemical 
facility and local residents in the community, who include the first responders. This 
interdependence can ideally lead to all parties focusing on accident prevention, through 
"inventory reduction and control, appropriate maintenance schedules, employee training 
on the safe handling of ...chemicals, safer storage, spill containment techniques, and 
improved facility security...[in addition to] dealing with process change and materials 
substitution" (Gablehouse 2005). Gablehouse (2005) also states that attitudes are more 
important than dollars, when it comes to most of these changes. If the community expects 
accident prevention to be a priority, facilities will give it more attention.  
 Due to the unpredictability of chemical emergencies, Gablehouse (2005) notes 
that in Colorado the emphasis has shifted to accident prevention, through a series of steps 
and communications with local chemical facilities. As members of local communities, 
LEPC members are stakeholders in the welfare of the region. Their concerns, according 
to Gablehouse, "mirror their community's concerns with facilities handling chemicals" 
(2005). Whitney and Lindell, on the other hand, state that LEPC resources in Michigan 
are spent mainly on plans to address and mitigate accidents when they occur (2000), not 
in preventing them. 
 In western Pennsylvania, Bowser (2009) found a positive correlation between 
increasing city size and allocation of emergency management resources. In addition, 
managers of larger cities perceived terrorism as a more serious threat than smaller ones, 
and also exercised their emergency plan(s) more frequently, according to the study. 
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Funding opportunities and restrictions were cited as a source of frustration amongst cities 
of all sizes in the investigation (Bowser, 2009).  
 Variation between LEPCs and between states may be due to a variety of factors, 
some of which have been elucidated through previous research. “…[S]tudies have shown 
substantial variation within and between states in the levels of local planning for 
hazardous materials emergencies” (Lindell and Meier 1994). Lindell and Meier (1994) 
describe “local planning” as activities that work towards meeting mandated requirements 
(i.e., compliance). Under EPCRA, all LEPCs are required to meet the same explicit 
requirements, but can decide locally how they are going to go about implementing them. 
Despite variation in implementation methods, the end results to meet compliance are 
consistent nationally.  
Organizational Theory and LEPC Effectiveness 
In order to comply with the regulatory framework within which they work, 
LEPCs need to be effective at what they do. LEPC effectiveness is a nebulous measure to 
operationalize and quantify, and has been seen handled in several different ways in the 
literature. The idea of effectiveness and its importance to the implementation of EPCRA 
will be discussed. Previous national studies of LEPCs have examined LEPC compliance 
and proactivity. Nationwide, LEPCs seem to be lacking in provision of information to the 
public, despite their intended policy goal of providing community right-to-know 
information (Adams et al., 2000; Starik et al., 2008).  
In Michigan, a series of internal and external factors have been named as related 
to successful emergency planning outcomes (Lindell & Meier, 1994). Successful 
emergency planning outcomes include the submission of an emergency plan and 
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completion of critical planning tasks as outlined by state emergency planning law. 
Crucial factors towards this include member inputs, staffing and organizational structure, 
and resources available to members as internally important factors, and support of the 
community and recent hazard management experience as externally important factors.  
Other researchers have found workplace climate as central to successful 
organizational outcomes (Lindell and Brandt 2000); Kopelman et al., 1990; (Lindell and 
Whitney 1995). Within an organizational setting, climate has also been correlated with 
technological updating and overall performance (Kozlowski and Hults 1987), along with 
accident prevention and safety program effectiveness (Zohar 1980). Climate quality 
within an organization was also significantly correlated with organizational antecedents 
and outcomes (Lindell and Brandt 2000). While each of these studies showed important 
contributions to understanding LEPC organizational function, they did not address 
LEPCs role in informing the public, or acting proactively to reduce hazard vulnerability. 
 The concept of effectiveness is at the core of much of the research on LEPCs. 
Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the term “effective” as “producing a decided, 
decisive, or desired effect” (2010). A review of the literature shows effectiveness defined 
in the following ways. Each of these concepts is an important component of LEPCs 
function within their community.  
 The literature points towards several factors that have been documented as 
influencing the effectiveness of LEPCs. Effectiveness has been defined skeletally in 
previous models as simply the submission of an emergency plan by the LEPC (Whitney 
&Lindell, 2000). Submitting an emergency plan is one of the primary functions given to 
LEPC under EPCRA. This research asserts further that proactivity is also a component of 
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effectiveness. For an LEPC to be “effective”, it must meet both the criteria for 
“compliance” and “proactivity” as conceptualized below. 
 Lindell and Meier (1994) used literature from three fields to develop their 
definition of LEPC effectiveness: disaster planning, strategic planning, and team 
effectiveness. Strategic planning theory states that an organization’s external and internal 
environment work in tandem with the group’s values to impact the entire process through 
which priorities are agreed upon and strategic choices are made about how to reach the 
organization’s goals (Bryson and Roering, 1987). These priorities therefore lead to an 
effective group. This includes much of the internal dynamics that influence group 
decision making, but seems to leave out some of the external forces that may differently 
impact team members.  
 Effectiveness is also equated with and made “measurable” by other researchers 
through analysis of emergency planning outcomes, the most objective of which is the 
submission and approval (by SERC) of a site-specific emergency response plan.  Lindell 
and Perry (1990), however, state that submission of a plan is, in and of itself, not enough 
to indicate an effective LEPC or a prepared community, but can be seen as an important 
indicator of emergency preparedness.  As noted earlier, additional emergency planning 
outcomes include completion of emergency planning drills, and work with industry and 
the community towards vulnerability reduction and sustainability.  This research asserts 
that additional “tangible” extras, such as promotion of inherent safety and hazard 
reduction concepts are also measurable emergency planning outcomes. Lindell and Perry 
make important strides towards a well-operationalized definition of effectiveness. 
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Lindell and Whitney (1995) refer to what they call LEPC team climate, defined as 
“members perceptions of team tasks and conditions”, along with the support of state 
emergency planning resources, as among the most important factors in the effectiveness 
of LEPCs. This research suggests that LEPC members’ personal experience of 
membership within the LEPC is an important component of the success of the 
organization. It also suggests that LEPCs that make better use of state emergency 
planning resources are more effective.  As a continuation of this, interaction with Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other knowledgeable Federal or State 
authorities may also improve activity and or proactiveness of emergency planning 
organizations. 
Lindell and Whitney (1995) also found membership in regional LEPC 
Associations, previous experience managing an emergency, and the use of automated 
technology influenced successful emergency planning outcomes. Later research found 
that institutional capacity (revenue, organizational efficiency and member activity level) 
also influenced the effectiveness of LEPCs (Whitney and Lindell 2000).   
In 2000, Whitney and Lindell also suggest that as LEPCs are primarily volunteer-
run organizations, organizational commitment or member motivation need also be 
examined in order to understand the drivers of participation. Having participating 
members is an essential component of an effective LEPC. In their study they found that 
organizational commitment comes in part from organizational goal identification. 
Participating in an organization that has clearly established goals improves member 
organizational commitment. In addition, Whitney and Lindell (2000) found that three 
types of leader behavior facilitate goal identification: leader consideration, leader 
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communication, and leader-initiating structure. Leadership within the organization 
appears to play an important role in organizational effectiveness. Finally, members’ 
commitment to the LEPC is also theorized to be increased by their belief that the 
organization can accomplish its set goals. Social learning theory states that when 
individuals believe they can accomplish a goal, it actually increases their ability to do so 
(Locke & Latham, 2002). In other words, perception of competence increases 
organizational commitment.  
Importance of decision-making to effectiveness. In addition to these factors, in 
order to understand how the effectiveness of an LEPC develops, I will introduce the 
concept of “framing”. According to Beach and Connolly (2005), a frame is “a mental 
construct consisting of elements, and the relationship among them, that are associated 
with a situation that is of interest to a decision maker,” in other words; it is the decision 
maker’s interpretation of the context surrounding the decision. How LEPC members 
frame events; how their experience and history influences their work together as a group, 
may be important in their effectiveness.  
For example, expert chess players, when presented with a chess board with pieces 
in reasonable locations from an ongoing chess game, can remember the locations upon 
removal of the pieces, and can accurately predict what moves might occur two to three 
steps ahead in the game. Novices, presented with the same scenario, can neither 
remember game piece locations on a game board, nor anticipate future moves. If other 
types of experts are similar to chess experts, they also may be able to “recognize 
meaningful patterns of events, and having recognized (framed) them can use them to 
perform the tasks that the situation demands” (Beach and Connolly 2005).   
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In an LEPC, expertise can be developed through several means, including past 
experience, education, and training. Fischer defines an expert as “someone with mastery 
over a body of knowledge and its relevant techniques” (2003). An LEPC with actual 
experience or expertise in handling an emergency, and/or with more extensive training 
may be better equipped to handle the demands of an emergency than an inexperienced, 
less-trained LEPC. This type of knowledge would likely be similar in LEPCs nationwide, 
as there is no reason to think that some portions of the country are better educated than 
others. There is generally a mix of expert and non-expert individuals located throughout 
the U.S.  
In addition to the influence of expertise, a frame is also a particular way of 
constructing a worldview. The development of frames by individual LEPC members does 
not occur in a vacuum. Each member develops their frame for handling risk within the 
context of the group, so there is a shared frame amongst the members. Members “align” 
their frames through discussion and dialogue (Beach and Connolly 2005).  Each LEPC 
also develops its frame within the context of the local and broader society and culture 
within which it is rooted (Trice and Beyer 1993). This shared culture is more subtle in its 
impact on group members, but equally important. The “framing” factors of expertise, 
education, training, and local context and culture may also be important in the 
effectiveness of LEPCs.  
 The area of LEPC effectiveness has been thoroughly studied, particularly by 
Whitney, Lindell, and Meier, and others, and contributes substantially to the 
understanding of the internal dynamics and characteristics of emergency planning 
organizations, including LEPCs. These internal dynamics are an important contributor to 
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the actions and measurable outcomes of LEPCs. Other factors also play a role, however. 
Emergency planning is a constantly evolving field in a rapidly changing, fast-paced 21st 
century culture. A wide variety of external pressures, including increased demands and in 
some cases decreased funding, are placed upon present day LEPCs and emergency 
management agencies. Under EPCRA, LEPCs were initially expected to manage EHS 
disasters. As necessity has required, they are also a part of the primary response network 
for natural disasters, and most recently, homeland security or terrorist threats. The 
convenience of the network of first responders threaded from county to county has made 
these emergency management networks an ideal first line of communication and defense. 
Similar to public schools, fire and police services, LEPCs are experiencing 
increased expectations in what is a difficult-to-quantify field. LEPCs have their original 
responsibilities concerning gathering and promulgation of public EHS information, along 
with emergency planning.  In addition, LEPCs have the relatively newly added 
responsibility of community terrorism/ accident preparation. There are serious, legitimate 
concerns about hazardous substance potential threat as weapons, and LEPCs have been 
saddled with the expectation of managing this threat, without much or any additional 
funding. 
Funding problems are paramount in emergency planning organizations. It is 
possible to tabulate the number of accidents responded to, but not the number of 
accidents averted. Without numbers to back up these “invisible” successes, it is difficult 
to justify requests for additional funds from localities. Even where emergency planners 
can justify more funds, the money is simply unavailable in a lot of cases. Functioning 
with high expectations and limited capacity has been a problem since the advent of 
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LEPCs in 1987. In addition to resource strains, there are philosophical differences about 
the “best” allocation of those limited funds in the disaster management literature. In the 
practitioner studies, most LEPCs are noted to have extremely limited funds, so funding is 
considered a systemic problem. 
Compliance and Proactivity  
In addition to being more-or-less effective, LEPCs may also be more-or-less 
proactive in their actions. The active development and use of proactive or precautionary 
measures is a means of reducing inherent levels of hazard in the chemical industry, and 
therefore inherently reducing hazard in local communities. The development of the 
“precautionary principle,” and the concept of “inherent safety” are indicators of a 
proactive approach to EM.  LEPCs that are more proactive may use precaution as a 
guiding principle for chemical safety and emergency planning. Precaution as a guiding 
principle in decision-making is a critical area of emerging research in the areas of 
chemical safety and emergency management. 
Statistically, normal accidents due to operator or machine error at facilities 
manufacturing, using, or storing hazardous chemicals are unavoidable (Perrow 1984). 
Due to the risk of normal accidents and the threat of deliberate attacks on chemical 
facilities, a movement towards the creation of safer and more secure facilities has been 
underway. This includes the increased use of safety controls (automatic shutoffs, alarms, 
etc.) and site security (guards, fences, etc.) along with inherently safer technologies 
(substitution of safer chemicals, lower temperature or pressure, limitation of impact by 
changing design or process conditions, and less material stored on site or materials stored 
in a safer form [liquid vs. gas] (Mannan, Rogers et al., 2003). The use of these 
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technologies is also a way for companies to stay ahead of the regulatory curve and reduce 
their liability by reducing on-site accident potential (Ashford and Zwetsloot 2000). 
Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAA) of 1999  
In 1994 the National Environmental Law Center (NELC) found that of 11 LEPCs 
surveyed in Great Lakes states, only 3 were promoting hazard reduction as a part of their 
emergency management plan (Stone, Gray et al. 1995).  In total, four out of the eleven 
LEPCs were aware of the concepts “primary prevention” or “inherent safety” (Stone, 
Gray et al. 1995). The LEPCs promoting hazard reduction were surprisingly not those in 
counties with the highest number of chemical accidents. It is expected that the promotion 
of hazard reduction, or proactive steps, will have increased substantially more than 15 
years after the implementation of the NELC survey. 
The definition and operationalization of the terms “compliance” and “proactivity” 
are key to this research. There is a fair amount of writing on “organizational compliance” 
in the literature. This thread is primarily with regard to “organizational citizenship 
behaviors (OCBs), and can be traced back to Bateman, Smith, Organ & Near (Bateman 
and Organ 1983; Smith, Organ et al. 1983).  This idea can be extrapolated back further to 
Chester Barnard’s “willingness to cooperate” (Barnard 1938). I have briefly summarized 
and noted this to emphasize that this is not the definition of compliance or organizational 
compliance that I am using for the purposes of this research. While this is a valid and 
useful definition of compliance, I have used a far more simple and explicit definition of 
compliance. Compliance, for the purposes of this research, as used by Adams et al. 
(1994), Starik et al. (2000),  and Templeton and Kirk (2008), is substantively defined as 
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meeting the objectives for LEPCs as outlined by SARA III. These objectives are 
explicitly stated in Table 1 (in Chapter 1) of this dissertation.  
Similarly, the term “proactivity” has been used in the literature to indicate entities 
that are acting in an anticipatory or advance-acting capacity. It may include taking 
additional steps above and beyond those required in preparation or expectation of a future 
event or situation. This general idea has again been used by others studying LEPCs 
including Adams et al. (1994), Starik et al. (2000),  and Templeton and Kirk (2008) to 
indicate a series of specific actions LEPCs may take above and beyond their statutory 
requirements, which might help better prepare these areas for future disasters. The criteria 
being defined as “proactive” are listed as factors in the right-hand side of Table 1 (in 
Chapter 1). These proactivity factors encapsulate activities engaged in by LEPCs that are 
“above and beyond” the basic LEPC obligations and further promote community 
chemical safety through various measures.  
There may also be a “personal disposition towards proactive behavior” amongst 
members of more proactive LEPCs (Bateman & Crant, 1993, p.103). As stated by Lewin 
(1938), all behavior originates from both personal and situational sources. Many factors 
have been loosely linked to proactive behavior on the part of individuals. Of course, 
organizations are made up of individuals, and individual behavior matters. Bateman and 
Crant (1993, p.103) also noted that “need for achievement …dominance” and other 
leadership qualities were correlated with more proactive behavior amongst students. 
Parker, Williams, and Turner (2006, p.636) state that proactive ideas and problem solving 
amongst wire makers was significantly associated with “role breadth self-efficacy, 
flexible role orientation, job autonomy,” and coworker trust.  So the conditions 
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experienced by LEPC members, along with their personal traits, may influence their 
tendency towards more proactive action. This is an important avenue for further research. 
This dissertation includes an examination of the relationship between external or 
structural characteristics and LEPC actions. Much of the literature on LEPCs focuses on 
psychological or organizational characteristics within the organization. I am interested in 
pursuing a different focus with my research agenda. I am investigating a relationship 
between structural characteristics and factors comprising indices for LEPC compliance 
and proactivity. The results of this research on LEPCs will provide insight into 
characteristics about external influences on organizational function and may also be 
generalizable to similarly structured organizations.  
A Note on Theory 
Portions of this dissertation may be considered to be a-theoretical. While it is 
based on a thorough review of the literature and discussions with experts, much of the 
theory is to be induced from the data, itself. There are at least two schools of thought 
when it comes to the relationship between theory and empirical research in the social 
sciences (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000). There is a more inductive approach 
to research and a more deductive approach. The deductive approach begins with a theory 
and then creates a hypothesis to test that theory. The inductive approach, the one to be 
used in this study, begins with an observation and pattern recognition and works its way 
up towards theory development. Induction is a more “bottom up” approach and involves 
the development of tentative hypotheses that can be tested and repeated to potentially 
form new theories. 
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The first deductive approach was put forward by Karl Popper (1968) and can be 
described as a theory before research approach (Popper 1968). This process of 
falsification can be summarized in the following five steps (Reynolds 1971): 
1. Development of a theory or model. 
2. Choice of an assertion derived from the theory to investigate. 
3. Test the assertion empirically through research. 
4. Use theory to examine empirical data. If the assertion is rejected by the 
data, re-evaluate the theory and start again. 
5. If the assertion is not rejected by the data, work to improve the theory or 
test anew assertion. 
The second school of thought, as advocated by Robert Merton, can be described as the 
research before theory approach (Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000). Merton (1968) states: 
It is my central thesis that empirical research goes far beyond the passive 
role of verifying and testing theory; it does more than confirm or refute 
hypotheses.  Research plays an active role: it performs at least four major 
functions that help shape the development of theory. It initiates, 
reformulates, it deflects, and it clarifies theory. 
 
The research before theory approach involves the following four steps in its process 
(Reynolds 1971): 
1. Study of a phenomenon and its characteristics. 
2. Detailed measurement of the characteristics (data collection) and how they 
fluctuate. 
3. Analysis of the data, looking for systematic patterns. 




The research of this dissertation is more reflective of Merton’s strategy than of 
Popper’s. While it is based in the theory and work of other scholars, it is not derived 
directly from any one school of thought or aligned with one specific theory. Merton’s 
justification of theory unfolding organically from the data itself is no less sound 
scholarship, when undertaken with thoroughness and clarity. In all likelihood, research is 
actually completed in more of a “spiral” or circular manner, where questions lead to 
hypothesis testing, which leads to theory development, “new” theories are tested, 
amended where necessary, and then the cycle continues (Berg 2001). Rather than 
choosing one approach or the other, it may be more a matter of where in the spiral 
research process a researcher picks up the intellectual thread.  
Questions and Hypotheses 
 As noted in the literature review, some of the most recent scholarship on LEPCs 
has been on compliance and proactivity levels. Three nationwide studies have been 
conducted, two by private contractors for the EPA, one by the EPA themselves (Adams et 
al., 1994; Starik et al., 2000; USEPA, 2008), looking at a variety of factors, many 
pertaining to LEPC compliance with the regulations created from EPCRA, and proactive 
actions. Templeton and Kirk (2008) performed a study of LEPC compliance and 
proactivity, looking at how these factors are influenced in LEPCs in Virginia. The three 
EPA studies focused primarily on tracking and documenting the current activity of 
LEPCs nationwide, and on best practices. No statistical analysis was done, as these were 
surveys gathering data to inform the agency on current practices in the field. The earlier 
two studies, completed for the USEPA, used frequencies and cross-tabulations to show 
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that planning areas with larger populations have increased LEPC performance (Adams et 
al., 1994; Starik et al., 2000). 
The results of the 2008 EPA study stated that “dedicated membership” and 
regular meetings were the most important contributors to LEPC success. This study also 
showed that the most active LEPCs had responded to an accident in the last five years 
and that only 20% of their respondents reported having some sort of operating budget.  
Blackwood (2003) studied LEPC performance in relation to activity level, 
population size, size of LEPC (number of participating members), presence of sub-
committees, funding, and paid staff. Specifically, he found that LEPC activity levels had 
actually gone down amongst study participants in Virginia when compared with previous 
research. The primary reasons noted for this decline were lower levels of funding, 
reduced public participation, and limited organizational structure of LEPCs themselves 
(Blackwood, 2003). 
Templeton and Kirk (2008) also collected information on the activity and 
proactivity levels in Virginia LEPCs. They tested specific hypotheses on the relationship 
between the activity and proactivity levels in Virginia LEPCs, and number of facilities, 
population size of planning district, type of LEPC (city, county, or joint) respectively, 
and the combined influence of these factors. This study used a binary logistic regression 
to analyze their hypotheses, with 39% of the activity level variation in their model 
explained by number of facilities present in the planning area (R2=.390, p<0.001) and 
nearly 36% of the proactivity level variation in their model explained by the same 
(R2=.357, p<0.001). They found no statistically significant relationship between activity 
and proactivity levels and “perceived effectiveness”. Perceived effectiveness was defined 
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in this study as a survey response to whether LEPC members subjectively felt their LEPC 
was effective. While this study showed a relationship between activity and proactivity 
levels and number of facilities, respectively, it left out other important factors that may be 
related. In addition to experience, funding and community characteristics may also play a 
role.  
The research questions and hypotheses in this dissertation were derived from 
careful consideration of the fields discussed above. The compliance and proactivity levels 
are established using the indices cited in Table 1 (Chapter 1). Factors included in the 
compliance scale are activities that are legislatively required of the LEPC. Factors 
included in the proactivity scale are activities that might be considered “above and 
beyond” the mandated requirements to ensure chemical safety and security in their 
community. LEPC compliance and proactivity’s respective relationship to each of the 
independent variables, including the number of chemical facilities reporting to a county’s 
LEPC, the urban/rural characterization of the county, the population size of the county, 
the accident experience of the LEPC, and whether or not they receive funding for full or 
part-time staff will be examined. Each of these variables will be justified below. It is 
expected that LEPCs are more compliant or proactive, (i.e., positively related) if they 
have: 
1. More regulated facilities in their county  
2. Have a larger county population  
3. Are more urban  




This study examines these factors for correlative relationships.  
x Question 1: What are the levels of compliance and proactivity for LEPCs? 
x Question 2: Are compliance and proactivity levels correlated with the 
number of chemical facilities, population size, metropolitan nature of 
community, and/or relative accident experience of LEPC, respectively? 
x H(1a): The compliance score is higher in LEPCs with more regulated 
facilities within their jurisdiction. 
x H(1b): The proactivity score is higher in LEPCs with more regulated 
facilities within their jurisdiction. 
Justification: LEPCs responsible for more regulated facilities have more inherent hazard 
in their jurisdiction. It seems reasonable to expect that knowledge of large quantities of 
hazardous materials would elicit greater concern, and greater attentiveness to compliance 
and proactivity actions.  
x H(2a): The compliance score is higher in LEPCs with larger populations 
in their jurisdiction. 
x H(2b): The proactivity score is higher in LEPCs with larger populations in 
their jurisdiction. 
Justification: LEPCs in areas with larger populations have more “at stake.” As a pure 
numbers game, larger populations are likely more at risk due to densely populated areas. 
Any EHS accident that may occur would have greater likelihood of impacting larger 
numbers of individuals. It is logical to expect that LEPCs would act to ensure that 
emergency plans (compliance) are in place and it is reasonable to think that these LEPCs 
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might go above and beyond their expected duties to ensure public safety in areas with 
larger populations. 
x H(3a): The compliance score is higher in LEPCs in more metropolitan, 
less rural areas. 
x H(3b): The proactivity score is higher in LEPCs in more metropolitan, less 
rural areas. 
Justification: Similar to the rationale for larger populations, LEPCs that include more 
metropolitan, less rural areas may have a stronger incentive to be compliant and/or 
proactive due to more densely populated areas. Metropolitan areas may have greater 
capacity (access to funding and resources) than more rural, isolated areas as well.  
x H(4a): The compliance score is higher in LEPCs with more relative 
accident experience. 
x H(4b): The proactivity score is higher in LEPCs with more relative 
accident experience. 
Justification: LEPCs with more accident experience might have learned from their 
experience and are therefore more likely to be compliant or proactive based on heuristics. 
If an LEPC has dealt with more accidents in its jurisdiction, relative to other LEPCs, they 
have first-hand experience of how prepared they are in some accident scenarios (as each 
accident will be unique in many factors, e.g. timing, substance involved, location, etc.) It 
is reasonable to expect that this first-hand knowledge might inform their actions, 
resulting in more compliance with regulatory requirements and more proactive action to 






Chapter III summarizes the methodology used to research Ohio LEPC compliance 
and proactivity levels, along with related factors. An initial review of the area of study 
will be followed by a discussion of the choice of survey methodology and its application. 
This chapter will conclude with a description of the variables, survey instrument, and 
analysis methods undertaken. Results and analysis of results will be presented in the 
following chapters. 
The creation of LEPCs dawned a new era in American emergency planning. The 
emphasis on local, participatory decision-making has honed the process of planning and 
managing disasters from a rough, patchwork of actors to a more cohesive coordinated 
system of local units. The compliance and proactivity of LEPCs are examined in relation 
to a compliance-proactivity index developed by Adams et al. (1994) and updated by 
Starik et al. (2000).  LEPCs were surveyed and demographic data was collected to 
characterize basic similarities and differences between LEPC groups. Several factors are 
explored specifically in relation to LEPC compliance and proactive behavior: county 
population size, characterization of jurisdiction (rural, suburban, urban), number of 
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facilities regulated within the county, and number of chemical accidents within the last 
five (5) years. Each of these is suggested in the literature as a factor that may affect LEPC 
compliance or proactivity. The methodology used for this research is primarily a web-
based survey of LEPC members, along with supportive data gathered from the 2010 U.S. 
Census.  
Research Design 
This project essentially captures a “moment in time” and provides descriptive 
information along with testing of the research hypotheses for probative causation. The 
survey method enabled the researcher to gather information from an accessible 
population in a convenient manner. Survey research is noted to be logical, deterministic, 
parsimonious, and has specificity (Babbie, 1990). The rapid turnaround and economy of 
design are also of great appeal in designing a research project of this nature (Babbie, 
1990). In general, web based surveys are considered beneficial for their cost-
effectiveness and convenience to respondents. Shih and Fan’s (2008) meta-analysis 
showed that responses from a web-based survey are similar to survey responses gathered 
through traditional mail survey methods with several caveats. According to Shih and Fan 
(2008), survey response rates are slightly higher on average in mailed surveys than web 
surveys, but this rate varies with follow-up reminders and type of population addressed. 
For this study, all respondents were offered the option of a paper survey if the web survey 
was not a suitable option.  
A cross-sectional Internet-based survey was used to collect information from a 
representative member of each of the sampled 87 LEPCs. There is one LEPC in the 
sample representing each of Ohio’s 88 counties, with the exception of Montgomery and 
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Greene counties, which have combined their planning efforts into one LEPC.  Ohio has 
been chosen as the sample area for practical reasons of research proximity (access) and as 
a convenience sample. All LEPCs within Ohio are subject to the same laws and 
regulations under the State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) and Ohio 
Emergency Management Agency (OEMA). It is reasonable to think that the results of the 
research study will be generalizable geographically to LEPCs functioning outside of Ohio 
that are demographically similar. The results of this study will be compared to the results 
of a previous nationwide study of LEPCs, as a means of assessing similarity or difference 
between this sample and the LEPCs in the United States overall and possibly enabling 
generalization. 
Study Sample and Population 
The study population consists of all LEPCs within the United States. There are at 
the time of the study more than 3,000 LEPCs listed in the USEPA database. Ohio was 
chosen as the location for this study sample for several reasons. Ohio’s geographical 
position, bordering the Great Lakes, the largest body of freshwater in the world, makes it 
a place of global consequence. In addition, Ohio was also one of the top three states 
accounting for TRI releases, along with Texas and Indiana, according to a survey of the 
data in 1988 and again in 1999 (Graham and Miller, 2001). These three states account for 
a total of nearly 20% of all national releases. Ohio’s high rate of TRI reported releases is 
primarily due to large numbers of small to medium sized facilities (around 1,550 facilities 
averaging 77,000 pounds of EHS per facility, or a total of approximately 119,350,000) 
(Graham and Miller, 2001). The most recent TRI data, from 2010, shows Ohio ranking 
fourth highest amongst all states nationally in TRI releases, with a total chemical release 
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(including on-site and off-site disposals and releases) of 159,028,131 pounds of EHS 
(United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2010) The top three highest chemical 
release states in 2010, according to TRI data, were Nevada (479,873,201 lbs. released), 
Utah (213,963,676 lbs. released), and Texas (209,685,795 lbs. released). So although 
Ohio is ranked lower nationally, the total number of pounds of chemicals released has 
increased within the last ten years. 
All LEPCs within Ohio are accountable to the same state government bodies: the 
Ohio State Emergency Response Commission (SERC), the Ohio Emergency 
Management Agency (OEMA) and the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA). 
This ensures some measure of “control” over the expectations and framework within 
which all LEPCs in the study are functioning. The variation from state to state with 
implementation of EPCRA is not unimportant, but is in general not of consequence to the 
characteristics being examined in this study. In general, one of the main implementation 
differences is the scale of each LEPCs jurisdiction LEPCS are organized by county in 
many states, but in others they are by metropolitan area or other designation. 
The survey involved contacting representatives of each of Ohio’s LEPCs at the 
time of the study. The sample of LEPCs included in the study was a convenience or 
purposive sample. LEPC members include representatives from the following groups and 
organizations: elected state and local officials; law enforcement personnel; emergency 
management personnel; firefighting personnel; first aid personnel; hospital personnel; 
health personnel; local environmental personnel; transportation personnel; broadcast 
and/or print media personnel; community groups; and owners and operators of subject 
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facilities. SERC appoints LEPC members to two-year terms of office, with opportunity to 
serve multiple terms.  
The USEPA LEPC database, available on the USEPA website, was used as a 
sampling frame for the LEPC population. Each LEPC was contacted by phone using the 
name and number listed in the USEPA public database.  A second, and for some, third 
round of phone calls was conducted before the name/ contact information of the best 
and/or current contact was found (frequently either the Information Officer or the LEPC 
Chairperson). Contact information (email address, phone number, knowledgeable 
respondent name) was confirmed during these phone conversations. All individuals 
contacted reported having access to email and the Internet at the time of the study, and all 
but one LEPC contacted agreed verbally that they would participate in the study once 
contacted with the materials. Participants were asked whether a web-based survey would 
prove problematic, but all agreed that they had adequate Internet access and would 
respond electronically, so no alternative means of survey implementation was necessary.  
In total 58 LEPCs responded and completed the online survey out of the original 87 
LEPCs that were sent surveys. This gives a sample response rate of 67% of the original 
sample.  
Validity and Generalizability 
External validity is related to the generalizability of the study’s findings. A 
grounded theory approach was used to study a sample of LEPCs.  Strauss and Corbin 
(1984) articulate the term theory as “a plausible relationship among concepts and sets of 
concepts,” as interpreted by Creswell (1998, p.56).  Shadish, Cook, and Campbell’s 
grounded theory of causal generalization was used (2002). Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 
 62 
 
recommend closely adhering to five principles in order to make appropriate causal 
generalizations. These principles are used to control for construct validity and external 
validity when looking for probative causal connections. Shadish et al.’s (2002) principles 
are included below in Table 3.  
Table 3.  
Principles to control for validity when looking for probative causal connections 
List of Principles  
1.      Surface similarity 
2.    Ruling out irrelevancies 
3.    Making discriminations 
4.    Interpolation and extrapolation 
5.    Causal explanation 
Shadish, Cook, & Campbell (2002) 
 
Each of the concepts included in Table 3 will be explained in detail, as they are important 
to the design of this study. The purposive or convenience sample used for this project is 
“not backed by statistical logic that justifies formal generalizations, even though [it]…is 
more practical than formal probability sampling” (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002, p. 
356). The theory of generalized causal inference allows for a logic for probative causal 
research based upon what scientists actually do. The concept of Surface Similarity 
includes the use of Campbell’s Principle of Proximal Similarity, which states that causal 
relationships found in one circumstance or situation are generalizable to another 
circumstance or situation that is similar on selected distinguishable features. Overall, the 
principle of Surface Similarity is an examination of the target of the study in comparison 
to the target of generalization, assessing for similarities (Shadish, et al., 2002). In this 
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case, the target of study, LEPCs in Ohio can be compared to the target of generalization, 
LEPCs in the United States. LEPCs throughout the U.S. were created using the same 
federal mandate (EPCRA) and are all expected to meet the same goals, regardless of their 
geographic location. They have a surface similarity in both their structure and function. 
Variations in geographic region, such as population density and hazards, also vary 
throughout the sample area.  
 Shadish et al.’s second principle of generalized causal inference, Ruling Out 
Irrelevancies, looks to distinguish any construct or variation that is irrelevant to the 
subject under study (2002). This principle looks for information that may differ between 
the study group and the group being generalized to, which is unimportant to the concepts 
and attributes being examined. The real differences that do exist between Ohio and other 
parts of the United States, may be of little consequence to this study. Irrelevant 
differences are discounted, as dealing with a hazardous chemical spill in a large city in 
Nebraska is likely similar in most ways to dealing with a hazardous chemical spill in a 
large city in Ohio.  
The third principle, Making Discriminations, distinguishes features that may limit 
generalizability. Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) argument states that any new construct is 
created with its author already having in mind how it differs from previous constructs. 
The very act of definition implies that one is creating distinctions, which must be verified 
(Shadish et al., 2002). The sample is within the boundaries of the state lines of Ohio, and 
there may indeed be some differences with the implementation of emergency planning 
and management methodologies in Ohio that are not consistent with other parts of the 
country. Hawaii or Alaska, for instance, may have unique circumstances to which the 
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generalizability of this study would not apply. Being an island state or a remotely located 
one may bring about unique circumstances that would not be seen in response to EHS 
emergencies in the continental United States.  
 The last two principles comprising the theory of generalized causal inference are 
interpolation and extrapolation, and causal explanation. The fourth principle, 
interpolation and extrapolation refers to generalizing “by interpolating to unsampled 
values within range of sampled… [items] and by extrapolation beyond sampled range” 
(Shadish et al., 2002, p.358). This principle states that frequently research includes 
external validity inferences and infers values between gathered data points, and above 
and below the observed range of data points for sampled values of a construct.  
Finally, Shadish et al.’s (2002) fifth principle involves the generation and testing 
of theories about the target of generalization. This causal explanation can refer to deep 
similarity, or similarities not seen at the surface. An example of this might be an 
examination of heart attacks in humans. Women and men are now known to show very 
different symptoms during a cardiac event, but the internal problem is the same; a heart in 
distress due to inadequate blood supply. On the surface, a woman with stomach pains, 
shoulder blade pain, exhaustion may seem to have a very different problem than a man 
with gripping chest pains and left arm pain, however the “deep similarity” is the true 
cause of both instances. Causal explanation is an important contributor to construct 
validity and external validity.  In this study, causal explanation will include careful 
examination of all data in multiple ways, multiple times. Examination of demographics, 
cross-tabulations, and correlations, in addition to logical, rational examination of the data 
are core components of searching for “deep similarity” between sample data and related 
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studies. By following these general guiding principles of probative causal inference, 
careful examination of this sample data can be completed with a non-probability, 
convenience sample.  
 The survey data was collected to characterize the population of LEPC’s 
location(s) on  compliance-proactivity indices (located in Table 1, Chapter 1). The terms 
compliance and proactivity are described in detail and examined in the context of their 
use by other researchers in Chapter II of this dissertation). An index is a combination of 
empirical variables used to represent the phenomenological abstract concept of interest 
(Bowen & Bowen, 1999).  
The factors included in the Compliance Index are those required by SERC under 
SARA Title III as responsibilities of LEPCs, and therefore indicate compliance with 
SARA Title III’s requirements. They are listed again in Table 4 below.  
Table 4. 
Compliance Index Factors 
List of Compliance Index Factors (derived from SARA Title III) 
Have a chairperson 
Have a community emergency coordinator 
Have an information coordinator 
Hold regular meetings 
Advertise meetings to the public 
Develop an emergency response plan (ERP) 
Submit ERP to the SERC 
Publish newspaper notice about availability of ERP 




These factors are shown in no particular order, but will be combined additively with 
uniform weights to give each LEPC a Compliance “score”, assuming we operationalize 
“Compliance” explicitly as the Ohio SERC’s requirements of LEPCs as completing the 
above.  In theory the compliance score may vary from zero, if the LEPC has not fulfilled 
any of the requirement, to nine, if it has fulfilled all of them.  Similarly, the factors 
included in the Proactivity Index will be combined to yield a Proactivity “score” for each 
participating LEPC.  The term proactivity is used to describe some of the activities that 
an LEPC might undertake that go above and beyond the requirements to achieve 
compliance. Completion of these items is the operationalized definition of proactivity for 
the purposes of this research. The proactivity factors are listed in Table 5 below. 
Table 5. 
Proactivity Index Factors 
List of Proactivity Index Factors 
Meet quarterly or more often 
Report making informed hazard reduction, accident prevention, or pollution 
prevention recommendations to industry/ local government 
Update ERP within the past year 
Practice ERP within the past year 
Incorporate proactive language into LEPC mission. 
 
The Proactivity score was constructed similarly to the compliance score. In theory the 
Proactivity score may vary from one, if the LEPC has not fulfilled any of the 
requirements, to five, if it has fulfilled all of them.  
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LEPC Survey Instrument 
 The survey itself is comprised of questions extracted from previously published 
LEPC surveys used by Lindell and Brandt (2000) and Starik et al. (2000) along with 
original questions. The survey instrument in its entirety can be seen in Appendix B. 
Lindell and Brandt (2000) survey was originally developed to study LEPCs in Michigan. 
The Starik et al. (2000) survey was a national survey of LEPCs in the United States 
commissioned by the EPA. As stated above, many of the survey components used by 
Lindell and Brandt were also derived in part, from previous surveys published in the 
literature (2000).  
Table 6 shows the relationship between the variables, research hypotheses, and 
survey questions. It is expected that the independent variables will all serve to positively 
influence both dependent variables (individually and collectively).  
That is to say, it is expected that the more chemical accidents within an LEPC’s 
jurisdiction, the larger the population size, the more urban (as compared to more rural), 
and the more chemical facilities functioning within a county, the higher the LEPC’s 
respective Compliance and Proactivity scores will be. Each of these is hypothesized to 
independently impact the scores positively, along with an aggregate effect. The survey 
was divided into several sections, including the following: 
9 Contact information 
9 About your locality 
9 About LEPC Meetings 
9 About LEPC Members 
9 About LEPC Activities 
  
Table 6.  
Variables, Research Questions, and Survey Items 
Dependent/Independent 
Variable Concepts theorized to influence LEPC Compliance 
Associated 




Dependent Variable: * chairperson   Q.   7 
LEPC Compliance Score *community emer. coordinator N/A  Q. 10 
 *information coordinator   Q. 10 
 *regular meetings   Q. 11 
 *advertise meetings publicly  Starik et al, 2000 Q. 17 
 *develop ERP   Q. 14 
 *submit ERP to SERC   Q. 15 
 *Public notice  of ERP   Q. 17 
 *Review plan w/in last year   Q. 14 
Independent Variable: Number of chemical facilities within LEPC jurisdiction H1(a) 






Variable Concepts theorized to influence LEPC Compliance 
Associated 
Hypothesis Literature Source 
Assc Survey 
Question 
Independent Variable: Population size of jurisdiction H2(a) 
Adams et al., 1994, 
Starik et al. 2000 Q.2 
Independent Variable: Relative accident experience of LEPC H4(a) 
Lindell & Perry, 
2001 Q.19 
Dependent Variable: 
LEPC Proactivity Score Quarterly meetings N/A Starik et al, 2000 Q. 11 
 Make hazard rdxn recommendations   Q. 24 
 Update plan w/in last year   Q. 14 
 Practice plan w/in last year   Q. 18 
 Proactive language in Mission Statement  Templeton & Kirk, 
2008 
 
Independent Variable: Number of chemical facilities within LEPC jurisdiction H1(b) Q. 21 
Independent Variable: Population size of jurisdiction H2(b) Adams et al., 1994, 
Starik et al. 2000 
Q.  2 
Independent Variable Urbanization of jurisdiction H3(b) Q.  3 






Generally, this survey gathered data about each LEPC’s activity and proactive 
efforts established using the criteria listed in Table 1, factors discussed in the literature 
review, and the conceptual framework.  A total of thirty-five (35) items were presented 
on the questionnaire. A number of these asked for descriptive, categorical, or nominal 
information about the LEPC, some were objective “yes” or “no” questions about the 
LEPCs actions, and a few were Likert-type questions. An example of a Likert scale 
question included is: “How familiar are you with your LEPC’s emergency response 
plan?” The response choices are: very familiar, familiar, somewhat familiar, slightly 
familiar, and not at all familiar.  Other questions with Likert scale response choices used 
the “strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree” choice set.  
The survey itself included a cover page and closing instructions, which are also 
included in Appendix B. The web venue “Survey Monkey” was used to create and 
administer the online survey. Responses were tracked and monitored on the 
SurveyMonkey website. All information on SurveyMonkey was available only via 
password on a secure server. All respondents’ data was kept private and was not visible 
to other respondents. The cover page was the first page seen by respondents on the 
SurveyMonkey login page, and introduced the survey, stated the objectives and goals of 
the project, emphasized the value of participation, made a statement about result 
confidentiality in compliance with IRB Regulations, and included information for 
retrieval of survey responses. A copy of the IRB approval form is included in Appendix 
C. 
Respondents were also reminded that participation in the survey is voluntary, and 
were provided with contact information for myself, my faculty advisor, Dr. William 
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Bowen, and the CSU IRB Board in the event that they had questions or concerns. It was 
stated on the login page that entering the access code and logging in to the survey website 
served as agreement with and understanding of the terms and conditions of the survey. 
The online survey format used radio buttons and textboxes; the copy of the survey 
included in Appendix B is a paper representation of this web-based document.  
Permission was obtained to include components of Lindell and Brandt’s (2000) 
survey instrument (see Appendix). Measures established in the survey questionnaire have 
been used and tested in several previous studies (James & Sells, 1981; Lindell & Brandt, 
2000; Lindell & Whitney, 1995). As a component of the survey, a goal identification 
scale, developed by Lindell and Whitney, includes nine questions about chemical hazards 
in the community and how effective emergency planning is in reducing these hazards. 
Organization-level data, such as degree of community support and media awareness of 
LEPC activities, evacuation experience, and subcommittee structure within the LEPC are 
included in eight questions in the survey.  
Survey Pre-test.  A brief note on the organization of Ohio’s emergency 
managers: for emergency management purposes, Ohio’s counties are divided into nine 
regions by OEMA. Each of these nine regions is headed by a regional field coordinator, 
whom oversees the work of LEPCs within their region. The draft survey was sent to the 
manager of the regional field coordinators within the Ohio Emergency Management 
Agency (OEMA), and the OEMA director. The survey was field tested by three members 
of the OEMA and two members of the OEPA. OEMA is the supervisory body to LEPCs 
in Ohio, and the field coordinators directly oversee LEPCs within their region of the 
state. These individuals helped to establish face validity and improve format and quality, 
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and were able to provide feedback on the survey instrument without creating additional 
bias in the study population. Their feedback was helpful in attempting to control for 
issues with technical concepts or practitioner-specific language use in the survey 
instrument. 
Field test respondents provided feedback that led to minor changes in the survey 
format, language, and length. They reported in comment that overall the survey appeared 
to include valid, relevant questions to the work of LEPC members, and that the 
length/time required for the final survey was reasonable for respondents to complete 
(approximately 20 minutes.) The length/ time commitment was important in attempting 
to obtain the highest possible response rate.  
Institutional Review Board consent.  All survey materials including 
introductory letter, survey instrument and required forms were submitted to the Cleveland 
State University (CSU) Institutional Review Board (IRB) for approval to conduct 
research with human subjects. Materials include discussion of participant privacy 
concerns and any risks presented by participation in the study. A brief description of the 
project, copy of the informed consent form and questionnaire was filed with the 
application. Approval was granted and is on file at CSU’s IRB office under: IRB Protocol 
28231-BOW-HS. (See Appendix C) 
Data collection.  The process of implementing the survey was a multi-step 
process following the Tailored Design Method, as outlined by Dillman et al. (2009). 
Once all of the contacts were made and the email addresses verified, an initial 
“prenotice” email was sent alerting the respondents that an email containing the LEPC 
survey would be arriving within the week.  Email was sent from the researcher’s 
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University email account to show its affiliation with a CSU student. All email was 
addressed individually to each respondent by name at the top of the letter. This “personal 
touch” was noted in the literature to improve web response rates (Dillman et al. 2009). As 
many individuals receive dozens if not hundreds of emails a day, any step that might be 
used to my advantage to improve response rates was taken. This was followed a few days 
later by an email containing a link to the survey, including a secure access code, along 
with an introductory letter. Email follow-up reminders were sent one week and two 
weeks after initial contact to non-respondents. 
Questions and hypotheses.  An examination of LEPCs was made based, in part, 
on two indices developed by Starik et al. (2000). These indices were designed to estimate 
the compliance and proactivity (or pro-activeness) of LEPCs (See Table 2).   
x Question 1: What are the levels of compliance and proactivity for LEPCs?  
x Question 2: Are the compliance and proactivity levels influenced by the 
number of chemical facilities, population size, metropolitan nature of 
community, and/or relative accident experience of LEPC?  
x H(1a): LEPCs compliance scores is positively correlated with number of 
regulated facilities. 
x H(1b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with number of 
regulated facilities. 
x H(2a): LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with population 
size of jurisdiction. 
x H(2b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with population 
size of jurisdiction. 
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x H(3a): LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with greater 
“urban-ness.” 
x H(3b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with greater 
“urban-ness.” 
x H(4a): LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with more accident 
experience. 
x H(4b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with more accident 
experience. 
 
Dependent variables.  The dependent variables in this study are the compliance 
score and proactivity score, respectively constructed from Table 1. The variables used to 
construct these scores or indices were objectively gathered by responses to survey 
questions. The values were summarized additively, with uniform weights. The 
compliance can be rated on a scale ranging from organizations that are least compliant 
with regulatory requirements or “not compliant” fulfilling less than five (5) of the stated 
requirements to “mostly compliant” organizations that complete five to six of the listed 
requirements, to “compliant” groups that complete seven or more of the listed 
requirements, as described and used by Starik et al (2000) and later by. requirements.  
 Similarly, following along the work of Starik et al. (2000), LEPCs were 
determined to be “very proactive” if they completed at minimum three (3) of the 
objective measures for proactivity (Table 1) and “somewhat proactive” if they completed 
at least one (1) factor. While these categories in both proactive and compliance cases 
were considered for classification purposes, they were not used during statistical analysis. 
Straight index scores were used as calculated (e.g. a score of “5” on a compliance index 
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was used simply as the value “5” in the statistical analysis.)  The two dependent variables 
are: 
x Y1 = LEPC Compliance Score 
x Y2 = LEPC Proactivity Score 
Explanatory variables.  Explanatory variables, extracted from the literature, 
along with their associated hypotheses, are listed in Table 6. The goal of the study is to 
elucidate which of these factors can account for variation seen in the dependent variables, 
LEPC compliance and LEPC proactivity. The explanatory variables have been 
operationalized from their conceptual basis, and included as questions within the survey 
questionnaire (Appendix 2). Each individual explanatory variable has an associated 
hypothesis, also listed above.  The data for the explanatory variables were gathered via 
responses to the survey questionnaire. The explanatory variables are as follows: 
x X1 = number of facilities within jurisdiction 
x X2 = population size within jurisdiction 
x X3 = urbanization of jurisdiction 
x X4 = relative accident experience of LEPC 
Each of these variables is being studied for its contribution to the overall level of 
compliance or proactivity of each LEPC and has been defined in the literature review in 
the context of other research and their expected relationship to each other. LEPCs in 
counties with larger numbers of facilities within their jurisdiction have a greater potential 
hazard (via quantity and/or location(s) of EHS) and it may follow that they would take 
greater measures towards preparedness. LEPCs in counties with larger populations have a 
larger number of individuals to protect, in contrast to a very sparsely populated county, 
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and therefore may take more or greater steps towards emergency preparedness. 
According to the literature, LEPCs in counties with more urban centers (greater urban-
ness than rural-ness) may be more prone towards preparedness measures to protect cities. 
LEPCs that have staff more experienced in actual management of chemical emergencies 
may work more towards compliance and proactivity as their experience has informed 
them of weaknesses and strengths of their capabilities. Finally, LEPCs with greater 
funding for staff may have better compliance and proactivity scores as they simply have 
more capacity. More money enables more action and preparation. Paid staff are more 
able to devote time and energy to working towards emergency preparedness than 
volunteers helping out after other primary employment. 
Coding and analysis of data.  Raw data was stored in a series of spreadsheets. 
Data for each survey question that was associated with a factor for the Compliance Score 
was scored with a zero or one for absence or presence of the factor by that LEPC. The 
totals for all Compliance Score factors for each LEPC were summed to equal that 
LEPC’s Compliance Score with a maximum possible score of eight (8). The Proactivity 
Scores were calculated using the same process on the Proactivity Score question data 
with a maximum possible score of four (4). Correlation tables and Chronbach’s alpha 
were used to ensure internal consistency for each of the factors that make up the Scores. 
Any missing values were tabulated, and cases with less than 90% response to the index 
questions were not included in the final data set. All hypothesis testing was established at 




 Coded data was sorted and summarized for descriptive measures, and are reported 
in the Results chapter of this document. PASW Statistical Software was used to 
statistically analyze data. Correlation matrices and factor analysis was used to ensure 
independence of variables. Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated data was not spherical.  
 Spearman’s correlation test was run on the data set, in addition to descriptive data 
measures. Descriptive data and correlation results were also compared, where 
appropriate, with previous U.S. data gathered for the USEPA. 
Bootstrapping 
The bootstrapping technique was used to resample with replacement giving a new 
sample of N=4500.  The new sample size was chosen to estimate a value closer to the 
total number of LEPCs within the United States. This technique allows the researcher to 
expand the sample, which is the best proxy of the population, in order to improve the 
statistics that result from the calculations. This technique makes the assumption that the 
sample collected is one of many possible samples that may have been gathered at the 
time of the research. Bootstrapping allows the researcher to estimate a sampling 
distribution for the statistic of interest (the mean) by taking repeated samples with 
replacement within the data set (Field, 2009). It essentially regards the data set as the 
population from which repeated samples are taken. By taking many repeated samples 
(N=4500), it is possible to estimate the sampling distribution and therefore the standard 
error, which allows the computation of confidence intervals and eventually tests of 
significance (Field, 2009). Data that was bootstrapped was used for hypothesis testing.  
 The dependent variable data are ordinal (categorical) in nature. The data collected 
from the indices provide information in reference to each other (ordered categorical data), 
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but not about the characteristics of the information between the data points. In order to 
accommodate this data, only appropriate analysis methodologies were utilized. 
Spearman’s rank correlation test was used to analyze the relationship between the 
dependent variables and each of the respective independent variables.  
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CHAPTER IV  
RESULTS 
Introduction 
 Representatives from a convenience sample of 87 Ohio LEPCs were sent an 
invitation to complete an online survey about their work practices and experiences as a 
member of an LEPC. Of those, 58 responded and completed the survey, giving an overall 
response rate of 67%.  Frequencies and cross-tabulations were computed to facilitate data 
analysis and comparison with a previously published USEPA study (2008). In 2008 the 
USEPA completed its most recent round of surveys on LEPCs nationwide. Data from this 
investigation is examined relative to national averages to analyze whether similar trends 
exist and to establish grounds for generalization to LEPCs nationwide.  
 The results of hypothesis testing are limited to measurement of LEPC compliance 
and proactivity, relative to the objectives being studied: number of chemical facilities 
within county, urban-rural characterization of county, chemical accident experience of 
LEPC, and population size of county. This study measures this relationship over the 
course of a period of time between one and five years. Future studies may provide a more 
longitudinal, comprehensive measure of these relationships by examining them over 
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longer period of time. Any results of this study compared with the 2008 USEPA 
nationwide study were only included when the questions were identical.  
Validity and Reliability 
In general, validity is a way to gauge whether the researcher is actually measuring 
the phenomenon that they are attempting to measure.  Threats to validity are always a 
concern in social science research, and attempts were made to control for threats to the 
validity of this study. Internal validity or logical and/or causal flaws within the research 
can be impacted by several areas within the research including subject variability, 
population size missing factors, and poor data interpretation among others (Shadish, 
Cook and Campbell 2002). Attempts were made to control for validity through the use of 
several methods. A partial correlation test, shown below in Table 7, and Chronbach’s 
alpha were used to establish measures of internal consistency. The partial correlation 
analysis showed that each of the variables being measured is independent and 
uncorrelated, and the Reliability analysis showed an acceptable result of D = 0.83.  
Table 7.  
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables   



































Principle Component Analysis (PCA), the results of which are shown in Table 8, 
shows that the four independent variables are more or less equally distributed in their 
explanation of the total variance. The extracted results show that each of the four 
independent variables explain approximately one-quarter of the variation noted in the 
sample. The primary outcome of PCA is to use an orthogonal transformation to look for 
correlation between the variables. This analysis also showed the independent variables in 
the data set to be uncorrelated. 
Table 8. 
Total Variance Explained by Principle Component Analysis 
Component Eigenvalues % Variance Cumulative % 
# of Facilities 1.14 28.499 28.499 
Population Size 1.054 26.341 54.84 
"Urbanness" 0.992 24.79 79.629 
# Chemical Accidents 0.815 20.371 100 
 
Survey Results 
Demographic characterization of counties by population size.  The 
respondents reported representing a range of county populations, in both size and 
urbanization (see Tables 9 and 10), with nearly 40% (23 groups) representing a 
population of 50,000 or less, almost one-quarter (13 groups) representing a population 
between 50,001 and 100,000, and around one-third representing a county between 
100,001 and a half-million individuals. Five percent of respondents oversee a county with 
between a half-million and one million people, and only around 3 ½%  of respondents 
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reported serving a population of more than one million individuals. When compared to 
US Census data from 2010, the percentages of each population category represented in 
this study are relatively similar to the percentage distribution of the state data by county. 
In comparison to the 2008 US EPA survey of LEPCs, Ohio contains a larger percentage 
of counties (LEPC jurisdictions) with populations in the 50,001-100,000 and 100,001-
500,000 categories than the nation has overall. The U.S. overall contains a larger 
proportion of small (population less than 50,000) LEPC jurisdictions than Ohio (62.5% of 
U.S.; 39.7% of sample). 
Table 9.  
 




US Census Data 





less than 50,000 23 (39.7%) 39 (44.3%) 62.50% 
50,001 to 
100,000 13 (22.4%) 21 (23.9%) 15.80% 
100,001 to 
500,000 17 (29.3%) 23 (26.1%) 17.20% 
500,001 to 
1,000,000 3 (5.1%) 3 (3.4%) 2.60% 
more than 
1,000,000 2 (3.5%) 2 (2.3%) 1.90% 





Characterization of LEPC service areas.  The service area most commonly 
represented in this sample was “Mainly Rural/ Some Suburban” with approximately one-
half of the respondent LEPCs response, while the second most commonly reported area 
represented among respondents was “Mainly Rural” with one-quarter of the response. 
“Mainly Suburban” and “Mainly Urban” each accounted for less than 10% of the 
respondents, respectively, and finally “Mainly Suburban/ Some Urban” was characterized 
as the service area for 5% of the respondents.  Comparatively as shown in Table 8, the 
distribution of LEPCs in the Ohio sample is primarily mainly rural/ some suburban 
(51.7%), while according to the USEPA 2008 study, LEPCs jurisdictions in the nation 
overall are more balanced towards an even split between mainly rural (45.8%) and 
mainly rural/ some suburban (41.3%.)  
Table 10.  
 
Characterization of LEPC Service Areas or “Urban-ness” 
Characterization of Service 
Area Ohio Sample f (%) 
2008 Nationwide 
Comparison Study (%) 
Mainly Rural 15 (25.9%) 45.80% 
Mainly Rural/ Some 
Suburban 
30 (51.7%) 41.30% 
Mainly Suburban 5 (8.6%) 3.70% 
Mainly Suburban/ Some 
Urban 
3 (5.2%) 6.60% 
Mainly Urban 5 (8.6%) 2.60% 
n 58 939 
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Characterization of LEPC membership.  Sample LEPCs reported more than 22 
different entities represented in community LEPCs, including emergency 
medical/hospital personnel, firefighters, emergency services personnel, law enforcement, 
regulated industry, public health agencies, Red Cross/ volunteer organizations, and 
state/local officials (all represented in more than 90% of groups surveyed.) A complete 
list of all represented entities is available in Table 11.  
Table 11.  
Representative Organizations Participating in LEPCs  
Groups Represented: Ohio Sample f (%) 
2008 Nationwide       
Comparison Study (%) 
Agriculture 22 (39.3%) Not included 
Chief Administrative Officer's Staff 25 (44.6%) Not included 
Civil Defense/ Emrgncy Management 52 (92.9%) 87.10% 
Community Groups 34 (60.7%) 63.60% 
Emergency Medical/ Hospitals 58 (100%) 83.40% 
Environmental Agency 34 (60.7%) 45.50% 
Firefighting 58 (100%) 93.20% 
Labor Groups 1 (1.8%) Not included 
Law Enforcement 58 (100%) 90.70% 
Local Industry 54 (96.5%) 68.30% 
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Groups Represented: Ohio Sample f(%) 
2008 Nationwide       
Comparison Study (%) 
Municipal/ County Attorney's Office 11 (19.6%) Not included 
Newsmedia (print, A/V) 35 (62.5%) 54.00% 
Planning/ Community Development 11 (19.6%) Not included 
Public Health 58 (100%) 83.70% 
Public Works/ Engineering 39 (69.6%) Not included 
Red Cross/ Volunteer Groups 54 (96.5%) 80% 
Schools 15 (26.8%) Not included 
State/ Local Elected Officials 51 (91.1%) 
State: 11.3% 
Local: 83.3% 
Truck/ Rail Carriers 7 (12.5%) 52.40% 
Other (please specify) 13 (23.2%)* 14.1%** 
n 58 939 
* Other includes: concerned citizens, amateur radio, Coroners office, Military, US Coast Guard, Bank, JFS  
** Other includes: local schools, colleges, universities, agriculture groups, public utilities 
 
 
Two-thirds of respondent LEPCs reported having greater than 20 members, while 
the remaining one-third reported between 11-20 members. The average meeting 
attendance was stated as being 11-15 individuals for 41% of the groups, with around 30% 
of LEPCs in the sample reporting between 16-20 attendees, and around 10% of LEPCs 
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respectively noting meeting attendance as either more than 20 members or 6-10 
members. One group acknowledged that its meetings generally included only 1-5 persons 
in attendance. So while most groups (two-thirds) in the sample reported having 20 or 
more members in their LEPC, more than 60% have meeting attendance of 15 or less 
participants.  
Table 12.  






Member Attendance at 
Meetings 
 f (%) f (%) 
1-5 members 0 (0%) 1 (1.7%) 
6-10 members 0 (0%) 6 (10.3%) 
11-15 members 8 (13.8%) 24 (41.4%) 
16-20 members 11 (18.9%) 20 (34.5%) 
more than 20 members 39 (67%) 7 (12.1%) 
n 58 58 
 
 LEPC membership numbers and meeting frequency.  Meetings were reported 
as occurring quarterly in the last 12 months for 44% of groups, biannually for one-quarter 
of respondents in the sample, annually for 16% (9) of groups, and more frequently than 
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biannually for 15% of groups. In addition, one LEPC reported meeting monthly for a 
total of 12 times in the last year.  83.5% LEPCs in the sample meet on average at least 
quarterly or more frequently. This is only slightly more frequently than the USEPA 
study, which reported 72.4% of LEPCs meeting quarterly or more frequently. Nearly 
10% of LEPCs in the USEPA study hadn’t met in the previous year, due to lack of 
member participation. 
Table 13.  
 
LEPC meeting frequency 
 
Number of Meetings 
Ohio Sample 
f (%) 
USEPA 2008 Comparison Study 
f (%) 
0 times 0 (0%) 80 (8.8%) 
1-2 times 9 (16.4%) 64 (7%) 
3-4 times 25 (43.6%) 352 (38.7%) 
5-6 times 15 (23.6%) 148 (16.3%) 
more than 6 8 (14.5%) 158 (17.4%) 
Other (specify) 1 (1.8%)* 107 (11.8%)** 
n 58 909 
* monthly 




LEPC member training, staffing, and funding/support.  Most LEPCs in the 
sample (76%) reported they do not have a formal orientation program for new members, 
but do form subcommittees to complete the organization’s tasks (80%).  Most respondent 
LEPCs also set annual goals and objectives for the organization as a whole (78%), assess 
their performance annually or more frequently (65%), and discuss the results of their 
performance appraisal within the LEPC (62%).  Nearly half of the responding 
organizations reported setting annual goals and objectives for their subcommittees (49%).   
 As shown in Table 14 nearly two-thirds (65%) of surveyed LEPCs reported 
having paid full or part-time staff, either working strictly for the LEPC or subcontracting 
from the local EMA. Most respondents (84%) reported staff working part-time (less than 
30 hours per week) including nearly one quarter of sampled LEPCs reporting staff 
working less than 5 hours per week.  
Table 14.  
 
LEPC Paid Staff 
Does your LEPC have paid full/ part-time staff? yes  f (%) no  f (%) 
How many hrs/week? 38 (65.5%) 20 (34.5%) 
1-5 hrs 8 (21.0%)  
6-10 hrs 7 (18.4%)  
11-20 hrs 11 (28.9%)  
21-30 hrs 6 (15.8%)  
31-40 hrs 4 (10.5%)  
other (specify)** 2 (5.3%)   





All respondents to the survey also reported some sort of operating budget (see 
Table 15). The primary sources of operating funds for LEPC activities are state fees from 
EPCRA submission (84%) and Federal HMEP (Hazardous Materials Emergency 
Preparedness) grant funding (73%). Fewer groups received funding from other sources, 
including local direct funding (16%), other state direct funding (7%), local fees (9%), 
private industry support (7%), and in-kind/ indirect support (9%).   
Table 15.  
 
Sources of LEPC Operating Budgets 
 
Source of Funding 
Ohio Sample  
f (%) 
2008 USEPA 
Comparison Survey  
State fees from EPCRA 
Submission 48 (83.6%) 54.20% 
Federal - HMEP grant funding 42 (72.7%) 39.70% 
Local direct funding 10 (16.4%) 33.70% 
Other state direct funding 4 (7.3%) 20.50% 
Local fees 5 (9.1%) 8.70% 
Private industry 4 (7.3%) 8.30% 
In-kind/ Indirect support 5 (9.1%) 56.30% 
No formal funding or direct 
support 0 (0%) 64.10% 
Other (specify) 10 (16.4%)* 4.8%** 
*Other grants, SERC Cost Recovery Program grants, other fines and penalties, donations 





This differs from the USEPA 2008 survey, which reported only 40.7% of 
respondents having an operating budget and a full 64.1% of LEPCs nationwide have no 
direct funding at all. If those results are accurate, more than half the population of United 
States LEPCs is functioning without an operating budget. By comparison, 100% of 
surveyed LEPCs in the sample have some form of operating budget. 
Non-financial support in the form of technical assistance or guidance is reported 
by study subjects to come from a wide variety of sources. According to this study, greater 
than 94% of respondent LEPCs have received technical guidance from State of Ohio 
agencies in the last five years, including SERC, State EMA, or State EPA. The Federal 
EPA has provided guidance to 29% of Ohio LEPC respondents, and FEMA has provided 
aid to nearly 13%. Agencies noted to support LEPCs in fewer cases include Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) (9%), Department of Transportation (DOT) (7%), and 
Department of Justice (DOJ) (4%). Less than one percent of respondents report receiving 
no technical guidance or support. By comparison, USEPA reports 27.2% of LEPCs 
nationwide included in their 2008 study received technical assistance or guidance from 
federal government agencies, primarily from USEPA (58.6%) and FEMA (51.7%).  
LEPC outcomes: Emergency plans and member familiarity.  The primary 
tangible outcome or “deliverable” of LEPCs is an approved emergency response plan 
(ERP); see Table 16 for related survey results. Of the organizations surveyed in this 
sample, the vast majority (more than 80% in each category) responded that their 
emergency plan has been updated, reviewed by the SERC, and exercised in some form 
within the last 12 months. Of the remaining groups, nearly one in ten groups report 
having reviewed/ updated their plan within the last 1-2 years. Of the remaining LEPCs, 
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only one group stated that it has been over 2 years since they’ve reviewed/ updated/ 
exercised their plan, and one group did not have knowledge of the last time their LEPCs 
plan was reviewed, updated, or exercise, respectively. When sample respondents were 
asked their personal familiarity with their LEPC’s emergency response plan, 72% 
reported that they are “very familiar” with the plan, while 28% reported being “familiar” 
with the plan. None of the participants indicated lack of familiarity with the plan. This 




Emergency Response Plan Exercise 
  
When did your 
LEPC last update 
its emergency 
plan? 
When did SERC 
last review ERP? 
When did LEPC 
last exercise its 
ERP? 
Time Period f  (%) f  (%) f  (%) 
less than 12 months 49 (83%) 50 (86.8%) 53 (94.3%) 
1-2 yrs 7 (9.4%) 7 (11.3%) 2 (3.8%) 
over 2 yrs 1 (1.9%) 0 (0%) 3 (5.1%) 
Don't have an ERP 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Don't know when 
reviewed/updated 
1 (1.9%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Other (specify) 0 (0%) 1 (1.9%)* 0 (0%) 
n 58 58 58 
 
* ERP not reviewed by SERC 
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By comparison, in the USEPA 2008 survey, only 58.7% of participant LEPCs 
nationwide reported updating and submitting an ERP within the year prior to the survey.  
This would seem indicative of either higher compliance with plan submission in Ohio, or 
of a “sea change” in LEPC plan submission between 2008 and 2010. While there has 
been increased attention on emergency planning of late due to the increased number and 
severity of natural disasters occurring worldwide, Ohio hasn’t been a focal point of these 
disasters. It is therefore unlikely that Ohio’s higher compliance with updating and 
submitting ERP’s is related to any outside influence that is different from LEPCs in other 
parts of the nation. 
LEPC outcomes: Emergency plan exercises and accident experience.  An 
additional requirement of LEPCs is that their emergency plan is exercised regularly using 
several methods over a five-year period. It is for this reason that LEPCs were asked to 
describe their plan exercises over the past five years, rather than the past year. The results 
are described below and illustrated in Table 17. The majority of respondents have 
practiced by using a “table-top hazmat exercise” (90%), and/or a “full-scale (multi-
departmental) hazmat exercises” (90%).  Nearly three-quarters of participating LEPCs 
stated they have exercised their plan using a “single function drill (e.g. communications 
drill)” during the last five years. Of the groups that stated they have exercised their 
emergency plan in some form, 96% reported having done so in the last 12 months. The 
remaining 4% of respondents report having exercised their plan within the last 1-2 years.  
By comparison, in USEPA’s 2008 survey, 71.3% of LEPCs that reported 
exercising their emergency plans reported doing so within the past year. This is also 
similar to previous nationwide surveys, which showed that approximately 69% in 1999 
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and 74% in 1994 had practiced their ERP that year. So nationwide, rates of plan exercise 
seem to be holding steady. Within Ohio, the number of LEPCs exercising their plans in a 
variety of ways seems to be notably higher than the average nationally. The reason for 
this difference is unclear, but may be related to greater funding level or more active 
groups. 
Table 17.  
 
How LEPCs are Exercising Their Emergency Plans 
 
 Ohio Sample USEPA 2008 Comparison Survey
Have exercised 
emergency plan 
no 0 (0%) 23.20% 




41 (71%) 47.80% 
Table-top Exercise 53 (90%) 83.50% 
Full-scale Exercise 53 (90%) 68.90% 
Actual response 34 (58%) 47.80% 
Public briefing  16 (28%) 13.10% 
Other (specify) 4 (7%)* 4.5%** 
 
* in-house drill w/private industry & schools, multi-functional, multi-agency exercise in conjunction w/ 
state, 16-county functional exercise 
** functional exercise 
 
In the Ohio sample, nearly 60% of total respondents reported responding to an 
actual emergency during the past five years, while only around one-quarter of the 
subjects report having had a public briefing on emergency management in the same time 
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period. As shown in Table 18, approximately one-half of respondent LEPCs stated they 
have managed more than 15 chemical accidents within the past five years. All other 
representative counties in the study responded to fewer chemical accidents according to 
study subjects. Seventeen percent of counties responded to 1-5 chemical accidents, 
around 20% of counties experienced 6-10 chemical accidents, and almost 10% saw 11-15 
accidents within the last five years.  
Table 18.  
Number of Chemical Accidents within Last Five Years 
Chemical Accidents Ohio Sample f (%) 
USEPA 2008 
Comparison Study (%) 
none 1 (1.9%) 18.80% 
1-5 8 (13.2%) 48.90% 
6-10 11 (18.9%) 12.50% 
11-15 5 (9.4%) 4.60% 
More than 15 29 (49.1%) 15.20% 
Other 4 (7.5%)* not included 
 
One-third of responding LEPCs revised their ERP (emergency response plan) as a 
result of their experience with chemical accidents. Only two percent of responding 
LEPCs changed their LEPC priorities, increased their meeting frequency, recognized a 
need for first responder training, or addressed HAZMAT equipment priorities, 
respectively in response to accident experience. One-half of LEPCs responding stated 
their experience with chemical accidents resulted in improved coordination in their LEPC 
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operations, but 43% of respondents felt that their experience with actual chemical 
accidents had no impact on the way their LEPC operates. This result seems cognitively 
dissonant in that the expectation is that experience with actual chemical accidents would 
improve response. This researcher posits that either LEPCs are adequately prepared for 
the type of emergencies they are managing (and therefore not gaining new knowledge 
from experience) or LEPCs aren’t recognizing learning opportunities when they present 
themselves. Another possibility is that experience with one accident may be irrelevant to 
future accidents, as each experience is unique and diverse compared to the next. 
Exploring LEPCs post-accident review process is another potential future avenue for 
research. 
By comparison, in USEPA’s 2008 study of LEPCs nationwide, chemical accident 
experience most impacted LEPC functionality by improving coordination efforts with 
industry/ facilities (54%) and by revising their emergency plans based on lessons learned 
(42%.) Similar to the results of this research, the 2008 nationwide study also stated that 
44% of LEPCs within the U.S. reported no impact from experience with chemical 
accidents in the last five years. 
 
 LEPC priorities and resources. LEPCs spend part of their time determining the 
size of Vulnerable Zones around chemical facilities. Participating sample LEPCs report 
using each of four different methodologies to complete this task: DOT’s Emergency 
Response Guidebook, EPA’s Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis, Computer 
Models (CAMEO, ALOHA, WISER, ADASHI), and/or GIS. Most commonly, LEPCs 
reported using DOT’s Emergency Response Guidebook (88%) and Computer models 
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(52%) in their determinations. Less commonly, groups stated that they’ve used GIS 
mapping (38%) and/or EPA’s Technical Guidance book (29%) as well. LEPCs were able 
to select more than one response for this question.  These results are not surprising, and 
support the idea that LEPCs are still limited in their use of technology when addressing 
local hazard planning.  
 When asked what resources are utilized by the LEPC for chemical information, 
emergency planning, drills, and actual emergencies, 92% of respondents reported using 
CAMEO computer modeling software, 81% reported using EPCRA Tier I and Tier II 
data, 56% reported using other GIS data, and 21% reported using RMP data. This finding 
reiterates the idea that use of technology in case of actual drills and emergencies is 
limited, and is similar to sources used in determining facilities’ Vulnerable Zones. 
In addition to obtaining information from books and electronic sources, LEPCs 
also rely on the services of supporting organizations and related groups for information 
and assistance in emergency planning. Survey participants were asked which 
organizations they interacted with in the last 12 months. Results indicated 100% of 
groups rely on State EMA, 98% depend on State EPA, and 92% trust LEPCs in adjacent 
jurisdictions with their concerns. Finally, 73% of LEPCs cited LEPCs in other 
jurisdictions (not adjacent to them geographically) and 60% stated EPA regional staff 
(USEPA Region V for this sample) were resources they used as well.  Table 19 below 
shows LEPCs rating activities their group prioritized. 
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Table 19.  
Activities prioritized by LEPCs within the past year 
Activities 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
f (%) f (%) f (%) f (%) 
Activities that award 
hazard reduxn 4 (7.7%) 20 (34.6%) 27 (46.2%) 6 (9.6%) 
Chemical release 
prevention 2 (3.8%) 17 (28.8%) 29 (50%) 8 (13.5%) 
Community emergency 
preparedness 0 (0%) 1 (1.9%) 31 (53.8%) 25 (42.3%) 
Community hazard 
awareness 0 (0%) 6 (9.6%) 36 (62%) 17 (28.8%) 
Community hazard 
reduction 1 (1.9%) 17 (28.8%) 32 (55.8%) 7 (11.5%) 
Hazard vulnerability 
assessment 0 (0%) 3 (5.7%) 31(53.8%) 22 (38.5%) 
Inherent safety 
opportunity audits 7 (11.5%) 12 (21.1%) 31 (53.8%) 7 (11.5%) 
 
The top three responses, combining the “agree” and “strongly agree” rankings, were 
community emergency preparedness (98%), hazard vulnerability assessment (94%), and 
community hazard awareness (90%). Interestingly, although community hazard 
awareness was ranked very highly as a priority, the majority of respondents reported not 
having a public briefing within the last five (5) years.  
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Impact of recent disasters on LEPC activity.  Next the survey participants were 
asked to provide information about their LEPC and whether any changes had occurred 
since the terrorist attacks of 9/11/01, as shown below in Table 20. In general, when asked 
whether there has been any change in their LEPCs overall activity since 9/11/01, one-
third of respondents state their activity has stayed the same, one-half of respondents state 
their activity has “increased somewhat,” and one in five groups state their activity has 
“increased greatly.” When asked what has been the target of the LEPCs increased activity 
(post-9/11), 80% of respondents selected “emergency planning”, one-half selected 
“educating the public” or “being proactive” respectively, and 20% chose hazard reduction 
or accident prevention, respectively. 
Table 20.  
LEPC Activity Post 9/11/01 
Since the events of 9/11/01, the overall 
activity of your LEPC has: 
Since the events of 9/11/01, which 
items has your LEPC increased its 
emphasis on (check all that apply): 
Activity Level Change: f (%) Activities f (%) 
Increased greatly 10 (17.6%) Emergency planning 47 (80.4%) 
Increased somewhat 29 (49%) Hazard reduction 11 (19.6%) 
Stayed the same 17 (29.4%) Accident prevention 10 (17.6%) 
Decreased somewhat 0 (0%) Educating the public 32 (54.9%) 
Decreased greatly 1 (2.0%) Being proactive 31 (52.9%) 
I don't know 1 (2.0%) other (specify) 5 (7.8%)* 




LEPC proactive efforts and familiarity.  In order to gauge the familiarity of 
respondents with terminology used to represent some of the more proactive actions 
possible for LEPCs, they were asked to indicate familiarity with several terms, the results 
of which are indicated in Table 21.   
Table 21.  
 
LEPC Familiarity with Proactive terminology & incorporation into Mission Statement 
 
Which of the following 
terms are you familiar 
with: 
Which are incorporated 
into LEPC mission 
statement? 
Terms f (%) f (%) 
Inherent safety 26 (45.1%) 18 (31.4%) 
Precautionary principle 13 (21.6%) 7 (11.8%) 
Primary prevention 30 (51%) 20 (35.3%) 
Hazard reduction 53 (92.2%) 42 (72.5%) 
Vulnerability management 47 (80.4%) 21 (64.7%) 
Comments 1* 1* 
*not commonly used terms in EM or LEPCs, none of the above, not sure 
 
Nearly all of the survey respondents stated they were familiar with “hazard 
reduction”, 80% were familiar with “vulnerability management”, and approximately one-
half were familiar with “primary prevention” and “inherent safety” respectively. Only 
one-quarter of study subjects recognized the term “Precautionary Principle”. When asked 
which of these terms were incorporated into the mission of the LEPC, three-quarters of 
the groups chose hazard reduction, two-thirds chose vulnerability management, and one-
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third chose primary prevention, or inherent safety. Precautionary Principle was only 
incorporated into 12% of respondent LEPC mission statements. 
 Finally, respondents were asked to rate their degree of agreement with the 
following: “The LEPC on which I serve has had a positive impact on chemical safety in 
my community (prevention, preparedness, and response.)”. 82% of respondents selected 
either “agree” or “strongly agree,” indicating a strong sense that these LEPC members 
feel that their LEPC is actively helping their community.  
Compliance and proactivity levels.  Using the criteria outlined in the 
Introduction in Table 2, participant LEPC responses were compiled additively and scored 
to determine group compliance and proactivity levels. The majority of respondents, who 
make up the majority of LEPCs within Ohio, were found to be both compliant with 
SERC and Federal rules and requirements and also very proactive, according to the 
criteria set out at the outset of this study. No respondents were found to be out of 
compliance, and only one was found to have zero proactive factors. Spearman’s 
Correlation showed mild yet significant correlation between the compliance and 
proactivity dependent variables (U = 0.026, D = 0.05). It is possible that the distinction 
between the two is not as clear as previously thought. It may be that proactivity is merely 
an extension of the compliance variable, as activity level has increased within the last 
decade due to societal circumstances (e.g. fear of terrorism, increased homeland security, 
etc.) In future research, a MANOVA test might help to untangle the correlation between 
the two dependent variables in this study. It is also possible that the weak correlation is 
an artifact of the large (N=4500) sample size generated from the bootstrapping. For the 
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purposes of this research, results will be considered with the possibility that the 
compliance and proactivity may not be viewed as separate entities.  
 Table 22 indicates the range of compliance and proactivity scores indicated based 
on the compliance-proactivity index. The dependent variables (of proactivity and 
compliance) included in the hypotheses are categorical ordered data, and it is necessary to 
use an appropriate methodology to analyze the data within the confines of its limitations. 
A Spearman’s Rank correlation methodology was used to examine the data for 
relationships between dependent and independent variables. 
 Table 22.  
Compliance and Proactivity Scores of Respondent LEPCs 
Respective 
Index Score Compliance Proactivity 
 f (%) f (%) 
0 0 (0%) 1 (1.7%) 
1 0 (0%) 2 (3.4%) 
2 0 (0%) 5 (8.6%) 
3 1(1.7%) 11 (18.9%) 
4 3 (5.2% 28 (48.3%) 
5 4 (6.9%) 11 (18.9%) 
6 3 (5.2% n/a 
7 34 (58.6%) n/a 
8 13 (22.4%) n/a 




Bootstrapping and Correlation Analysis 
To improve robustness of the data analysis, the bootstrap technique was employed 
to resample the data with replacement. The bootstrap method is a means of computer-
based simulation designed to improve statistical inference by “assigning measures of 
accuracy to statistical estimates” (Efron and Tibshirani 1998). Bootstrapping is a non-
parametric method of data resampling, designed to approximate the sampling distribution 
of an estimator (Cassell, 2007). As a non-parametric method, it makes no assumptions 
about the distribution of the original data sample and assumes that it is one out of any 
number of random samples that may have been collected. Instead the bootstrap technique 
acts to take many random sub-samples of the “original sample” in order to increase the 
strength of the statistical argument. This is useful in this situation as the original data was 
drawn from a small sample of n=58. The bootstrap sample size can be set at any number, 
one commonly used sample value is 1,000. As a means of attempting simulation of the 
LEPCs in the United States, n=4500 was used for statistical analysis.  
The mean and standard deviation computed from the bootstrapped data were used 
in a correlation analysis to examine the relationship between each of the dependent and 
independent variables.3 Each of the hypotheses is described with justification for the 
expectations in the literature review section of this document. The relationships and 
results noted will be described below. Table 23 shows Spearman’s Correlation results for 
                                                 
3  Binary logistic regression analysis was used initially to test the hypotheses, with 
no significant results. Correlation analysis was chosen as a more appropriate statistic to 




the four tested hypotheses. Of those listed, only “proactivity” and “number of facilities” 
is significantly correlated.  
Table 23.  



























*Significantly correlated at the 0.01 level.               N=4500 
**Nearly significant correlation, significance at 0.06 level. 
 
x H(1a): LEPCs compliance scores is positively correlated with number of 
regulated facilities. 
x H(1b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with number of 
regulated facilities. 
Compliance and number of regulated facilities was positively correlated (U = 
.038, D = 0.01). It is logical that the more regulated facilities an LEPC is working with, 
the more likely they would be compliant.  More facilities means more hazard, and LEPCs 
work to help mitigate that hazard. The cross-tabulation below in Table 24 shows how the 
majority of LEPCs in the sample are relatively compliant and have less than 45 regulated 
facilities within their jurisdiction. 
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Table 24.  
Cross-tabulation of Compliance scores by Number of Regulated Facilities in Jurisdictions 
Number of Regulated Facilities 
Compliance 





3  1      1 
4  2    1  3 
5 3      1 4 
6 1 1      2 
7 8 11 7 2 4 2 1 35 
8 5 3 1 2 1  1 13 
Grand Total 17 18 8 4 5 3 3 58 
 
Proactivity and number of regulated facilities was not significantly correlated. 
This was surprising, as one would expect that proactivity might go up in areas with more 
regulated facilities. It is also possible that LEPC participants are simply preoccupied with 
simply managing and reacting to hazards posed by greater number of regulated facilities 
within their jurisdiction. They may not have the capacity to be proactive, but only enough 
to keep up with the status quo. This is something to consider more thoroughly in future 
research. 
x H(2a): LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with population 
size of jurisdiction. 
x H(2b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with population 
size of jurisdiction. 
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There was no significant correlation between compliance and population size or 
proactivity and population size. However, there was an almost significant correlation 
between proactivity and population size (U = -0.023). This lack of a significant finding 
was surprising. It was expected that areas with larger populations would be more 
compliant or proactive than other areas. This “lack” of finding may be due to there being 
generally high levels of both compliance and proactivity throughout the sample. 
Particularly when compared to the 2008 USEPA nationwide data, Ohio has higher levels 
of both compliance and proactivity than the United States does overall. Table 25 shows 
the cross-tabulation between compliance score and population size within an LEPC 
jurisdiction. The majority of LEPCs in the sample have populations of less than 500,000 
within their jurisdiction and are relatively compliant with meeting the regulatory 
requirements for LEPCs. 
Table 25.  
Cross-Tabulation of Compliance Score and Population Size 












3  1    
4   2 1  
5 3    1 
6 1 1    
7 14 9 10 2  




 The near significant correlation (D = 0.065) between proactivity and population 
size suggests there may be something here worth looking into further for future research. 
There is data in the public administration literature that suggests that more heavily 
populated areas have organizations with greater capacity (capacity meaning access to 
funding, staff, services). There may be a link to look into in future research between 
proactivity in LEPCs and organizational capacity. Table 26 shows the cross-tabulation of 
the proactivity scores by population size of the sample jurisdictions.  
Table 26.  
Cross-Tabulation of Proactivity Score and Population Size 












0 1     
2 5     
3 6 4 4  1 
4 13 8 12 3 1 
 
x H(3a): LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with greater 
“urban-ness.” 
x H(3b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with greater 
“urban-ness.” 
There was no significant correlative relationship between compliance score and 
characterization of the jurisdiction or between proactivity score and the same. It was 
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expected that more urban areas would be more compliant and more proactive than more 
rural areas.  
x H(4a): LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with more accident 
experience. 
x H(4b): LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with more accident 
experience. 
Neither compliance nor proactivity was significantly correlated with accident 
experience of LEPC. LEPCs with more accident experience within the past year were 
expected to be more compliant and proactive. Direct first-hand experience with accidents 
was expected to result in LEPCs more motivated to meet and possibly exceed compliance 
requirements in order to ensure their preparedness for future accidents. Again, relatively 
high rates of compliance and proactivity in the sample overall might account for less 
sensitivity to variation related to accident experience. Future research might also address 
a longer retrospective time horizon for accident experience. There may be a longer lag 
time between accident experience and organizational changes, depending on the pace of 
change within the organization. 
 A few other interesting findings not included in the hypothesis testing are 
included in the next few tables below. Table 27 shows a cross-tabulation between funding 
for staff and number of chemical accidents. The interesting finding is that more than 1/3 
of respondents (23/58) had funding for staff and also reported responding to more than 15 
EHS accidents/ spills within the past year. This suggests that funding is following number 
of accidents. The researcher cannot posit another logical reason to think areas with 
greater funding would have more accidents. 
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Table 27.  
Cross-Tabulation of Staff Funding and Number of Chemical Accidents in Previous Year 
  Funding for Staff 
# of Chemical Accidents No Yes Grand Total 
0 1 0 1 
1-5 4 3 7 
6-10 4 8 12 
11-15 2 3 5 
15+ 10 23 33 
Grand Total 21 37 58 
 
For comparison, Table 28 below shows the cross-tabulation of funding for staff 
and number of EHS facilities within an LEPCs jurisdiction. If the increased funding is 
due primarily to increase hazard (i.e. more EHS facilities) it would seem the pattern 
would be similar between funding and number of facilities as it is between funding and 
number of accidents. This is another area of note to follow up in future research. 
In Table 28, the cross-tabulation between LEPC staff funding and the number of 
regulated facilities within a county are not similar in trend to the results for number of 
accidents and funding. This suggests that perhaps funding is being allocated more heavily 




Table 28.  
Cross-Tabulation of Funding For Staff and Number of Facilities within a Jurisdiction 
# of Facilities no yes Grand Total 
0-15 8 9 17 
101-200 1 2 3 
16-30 7 11 18 
31-45 2 6 8 
46-60 1 3 4 
61-100 1 4 5 
more than 200 1 2 3 
Grand Total 21 37 58 
 
Finally, LEPCs were asked subjectively whether they felt that their activities had 
changed at all since the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001. The results of a cross-tabulation of 
an LEPCs’ own assessment of their activity level change since 9/11/2001 and their 
proactivity score is shown below in Table 29.   Most LEPCs responded that the activity 
levels of their group “increased somewhat” (32/58), and the majority of those (23/32) 
were considered extremely proactive, having completed at least four of the factors listed 
on the proactivity index.  
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Table 29.  
















0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
2 0 1 3 1 0 5 
3 0 0 4 7 4 15 
4 1 0 8 23 5 37 
Grand Total 1 1 15 32 9 58 
 
 The implications of these research findings bring light to some of the changes in 
LEPC structure and actions since their inception 25 years ago. Much of the work of 
LEPCs is fraught with complexity and uncertainty. These minimally funded 
organizations are trying to make the best of an imperfect system to help ensure 
community safety and security. The implications will be discussed further in the 






 This chapter summarizes the importance of this topic and how this particular 
study contributes to greater understanding of emergency planning and its functions. In 
Section 5.1 a review of the research results and hypothesis tests will be followed by a 
discussion of additional findings not in the original research questions. Section 5.2 will 
discuss theoretical and practitioner implications. Section 5.3 will examine the limitations 
of this study and how it informs future research. Finally, in Section 5.4, the chapter 
concludes with suggestions for future research based on findings and final comments 
drawn from the research findings.   
Emergency planning is an evolving field. Since the inception of EPCRA in 1987, 
the field has had to adapt to a world with greater threats of terrorism and a more 
tumultuous ecosystem with regard to severity and frequency of natural disasters. Events 
like the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan and subsequent nuclear catastrophe 
illustrate some of the complexity and unforeseen complications that can occur when 
serious disaster strikes.  It is estimated that around 20,000 people were killed in the 
catastrophe. In the United States, we have begun to adapt our emergency planning to a 
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more "all-hazards" approach to localize planning for many types of emergencies within a 
few coordinating agencies at each locality. The results of this study show that LEPCs are 
doing their best to keep up with the jobs they have been tasked with, and in the study 
sample, are faring better than has been reported in several previous national surveys.  
Summary of Research Results and Results of Hypothesis Tests 
 In 1987, EPCRA took United States environmental policy in a bold direction 
towards “informational regulation” of environmental hazards. Inclusion of the public in 
hazardous chemical emergency planning was thought to improve the quality of 
emergency response by bringing together experts and local stakeholders in important 
decisions about disaster planning and management. Overall the LEPCs studied in this 
research were meeting the expectations and standards set out for them, with regards to 
emergency planning. Provision of information to the public was achieved in lesser 
numbers.   
 LEPCs in this study came from primarily smaller population counties with around 
60% of the sample from counties with populations under 100,000 people. These counties 
are primarily considered “mainly rural/ some suburban”. In the United States overall, the 
largest represented area in general is slightly less populous, with around 60% being under 
50,000 in each LEPC jurisdiction. All LEPCs that participated in the survey included 
diverse memberships, and most reported having good attendance at meetings, on average 
around 15 out of 20 members attending meetings. Most LEPCs in the sample reported 
meeting regularly, with more than 80% of the sample stating that they met at least 
quarterly. This is slightly higher than the national average of 72% meeting at least 
quarterly according to the USEPA’s 2008 survey.  
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 The work of the LEPC is still primarily being done on a volunteer basis. While 
65% of the sample responded that they do have paid staff, more than 80% of those with 
paid staff reported the work as part-time (less than 30 hours per week.) To break it down 
further, one-quarter of that 80% part-time staff is working less than five hours per week 
on a paid basis. So while there is funding for staff, it is minimal in most cases. 
 The Ohio sample does appear to have greater funding overall than the US LEPCs 
on average, with all groups in the sample reporting some form of operating budget. 
USEPA’s 2008 study reports that only 40% of LEPCs stated that they have any operating 
budget nationwide. Even if the funding isn’t adequate, some funding must be better than 
none. This may be an important distinction between LEPCs in the Ohio sample and 
LEPCs nationwide.  
 Hypothesis testing.  Respective compliance and proactivity scores were 
calculated from an index for each LEPC in the sample. The components of the index 
were taken from individual survey questions and summarized additively with uniform 
weights to determine each score.  The compliance-proactivity index itself was an 
instrument established by Starik et al. (2000) in a previous National LEPC survey 
commissioned by the USEPA. It has since been utilized and reported in the literature by 
Templeton and Kirk (2008).  The compliance component of the index is a straight-
forward assessment of the regulatory requirements for LEPCs to maintain compliance 
with the State Emergency Response Commission. The proactive component of the index 
will be discussed below. 
 Eight hypotheses were tested in the statistical analysis of the survey data. 
Correlation, rather than causation, was established where statistically significant 
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relationships were noted. Only one of the eight tested hypotheses resulted in a significant 
correlation, but each will be discussed briefly.  
Hypothesis 1a.  LEPC compliance scores are positively correlated with number of 
regulated facilities. This hypothesis was tested and confirmed at a statistically significant 
level, at a 99% confidence level. This indicates that LEPCs in areas with larger numbers 
of regulated facilities are correlated with higher compliance scores. This is a logical 
association as more facilities means greater hazard which is an excellent rationale for 
increased compliance.  
 Hypothesis 1b. LEPC proactivity score is not positively correlated with number of 
regulated facilities.  This hypothesis was not significantly correlated and was therefore 
unsupported. This was surprising, as one would expect that proactivity might go up in 
areas with more regulated facilities. This is something to consider more thoroughly in 
future research. 
 Hypothesis 2a. LEPC compliance score is not positively correlated with 
population size of jurisdiction.   
 Hypothesis 2b. LEPC proactivity score is mildly positively correlated with 
population size of jurisdiction.  There was no significant correlation between compliance 
and population size or proactivity and population size. However, there was an almost 
significant correlation between proactivity and population size (U = -0.023, D = 0.065).  It 
was expected that areas with larger populations would be more compliant or proactive 
than other areas. Future studies may focus on selecting a sample that purposively chooses 
matched sets of proactive/ not proactive and compliant/ not compliant groups in order to 
study variation in select variables.  
 115 
 
Hypothesis 3a. LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with greater 
“urban-ness”. 
Hypothesis 3b. LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with greater 
“urban-ness”. There was no significant correlative relationship between compliance score 
and characterization of the jurisdiction or between proactivity score and the same. It was 
expected that more urban areas would be more compliant and more proactive than more 
rural areas. Urban areas theoretically have more resources to deal with historically higher 
levels of hazardous chemicals. Those resources would seem to lead to greater LEPC 
compliance and proactivity in urban areas, but the hypothesis wasn’t borne out.  
Hypothesis 4a. LEPC compliance score is positively correlated with more 
accident experience. 
Hypothesis 4b. LEPC proactivity score is positively correlated with more accident 
experience.  Neither compliance nor proactivity was significantly correlated with 
accident experience of LEPC. LEPCs with more accident experience within the past year 
were expected to be more compliant and proactive. Direct first-hand experience with 
accidents was expected to result in LEPCs being more motivated to meet and possibly 
exceed compliance requirements in order to ensure their preparedness for future 
accidents. Again, relatively high rates of compliance and proactivity in the sample overall 
might account for less sensitivity to variation related to accident experience. Future 
research might also address a longer retrospective time horizon for accident experience. 
There may be a longer lag time between accident experience and organizational changes 
in response to that experience, depending on the pace of change within the organization. 
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Other findings.  The Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is one of the primary 
measurable outcomes from LEPC activity, and an important component of disaster 
planning in general. In addition to creating a plan for complex and varied emergency 
scenarios, LEPCs are expected to update and exercise that plan on a regular basis to 
maintain compliance and keep their state funding. Overall, the Ohio sample was updating 
and exercising their emergency plans as expected (more than 80% of the time) and 
performing fairly well. This would seem a good indication of emergency preparedness. 
With 80% of the study sample updating and exercising their ERP as expected, this was 
well above the 58% noted in the National 2008 results.  This is another important 
difference between the Ohio sample and other US LEPCs. One caveat to this positive 
measure was the expectation to complete a public briefing.  
In the five-year rotation of emergency plan exercises, the public briefing was 
noted as being the least likely type of exercise to have occurred; only 28% of sampled 
LEPCs stated they had completed a public briefing in the last five years. Again, this 
shows that informing the public is one of the weaknesses of LEPC activity. The original 
intent of SARA III, the law that mandated the formation of LEPCs, was to use 
stakeholder participation to encourage industry compliance with chemical laws, and work 
towards reduction of chemicals in highly populated areas. This is an impossible goal with 
an uninformed populace. This is an area of major failure for LEPCs, as currently 
functioning.  
 Groups in the sample responded to chemical spills and emergencies far more 
often than the nation overall. Nearly 50% of the Ohio sample LEPCs reported responding 
to 15 or more accidents in the past year, while only 15% of LEPCs nationwide responded 
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to the same number. Ohio appears to be a more active state with regards to number of 
accidents than the nation overall. This makes sense given what is known about Ohio’s 
chemical facilities. TRI data from 2010 shows Ohio ranking fourth highest amongst all 
states for chemical releases (USEPA, 2010).  
 When asked to prioritize LEPC activities, LEPCs in the sample chose 
“community emergency preparedness” (98% of respondents), “hazard vulnerability 
assessment” (94% of respondents), and “community hazard awareness” (90% of 
respondents) as either activities they “agree” or “strongly agree” are important to their 
LEPC. Assessing vulnerabilities and preparing for emergencies corroborates other 
findings in the survey, but prioritizing community hazard awareness is a surprise. This 
seems incongruent with the lack of public briefings on emergency drills within the last 
five years noted amongst three-quarters of the sampled groups.  
 Since 9/11/01 terrorist attacks, sampled LEPCs did note some changes in the 
activity level and emphasis of their organizations. Most notably, 65% of LEPCs stated 
that their activity level increased somewhat or greatly with the top three emphasized 
activities being emergency planning (80% of response), educating the public (55% of 
response), and being proactive (53% of response). Again, providing information to the 
public is emphasized as a priority activity since 2001, but evidence for this priority in 
action is unclear or absent.  
 Proactivity.  The proactivity index used in this study is the only one the 
researcher noted published in the literature reviewed on proactive LEPC activity. The 
results of this study suggest that the index is under-conceptualized. As also suggested by 
Templeton and Kirk (2008), quantifying as complex an idea as “proactivity” on a simple 
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index score doesn’t capture the complexity and nuance of the activity included in the 
concept. There are a myriad of activities that may also be considered proactive that were 
not included in the scale. Broader themes of public education and outreach, member 
training, and collaboration with other LEPCs might be considered in future 
conceptualizing of the idea. More clearly capturing the idea of proactivity may help guide 
future practical LEPC directions and also research on the topic. Specifically, as 
proactivity has been defined in this and previous studies mentioned by USEPA, 
Templeton and Kirk (1998) and others, LEPCs are achieving many of the conditions 
defined as proactive. “Proactive” activities such as meeting more frequently, updating 
and practicing an ERP more frequently, and making accident prevention 
recommendations to industry and local government are being completed by many of the 
groups studied in this project.  
 Given the current complexity and level of hazard we live in, this proactivity may 
not go far enough. By taking a more precautionary approach, and focusing on mitigation 
and hazard reduction activities, LEPCs can move communities to safer, long-term 
sustainable future. By reconceptualizing proactivity as precaution, as defined by the 
precautionary principle and some of the related inherent safety concepts, emergency 
management activity can be viewed through a different lens which may provide more 
nuance into how emergency management functions and a more sustainable future.  
Theoretical and Practitioner Implications 
 Local Emergency Planning Committees were created with the original intent of 
using a stakeholder-based model of decision-makers as local participants in the 
emergency planning process.  Hazard information was to be made publicly available to 
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encourage local participation. In order for LEPCs to function as intended, informing and 
educating the public and emergency planning participants is a critical step.  Without 
information and access, the public is unable to address accident/ exposure risk within 
their community. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, access to information has been made 
more difficult. Public Internet access to Risk Management Program Rule (RMP) data has 
been redacted indefinitely. The USEPA recently issued a statement saying that in light of 
concerns about ease of access to chemical hazard quantity and location information, 
information will continue to be withheld from the internet, and will have to be obtained in 
person by qualified parties in order to maintain security due to heightened safety 
concerns. Information security is a very valid concern under terrorist threat, but lack of 
access to information undermines the very principles upon which SARA III was built.  
 The results of this study corroborate the inherent difficulties LEPCs experience 
with the community education component of the edict. This research found LEPCs in the 
study sample to still value or give “lip service” to the idea and merit of informing the 
public enough to include it in their mission statements and name it as a priority activity, 
but their actual communication activities were limited at best. Most groups hadn’t had a 
public meeting to review their emergency plans within the last five years, and many 
hadn’t published information regularly to notify the public of meetings. In this study, 
90% of respondent LEPCs still state that they value community hazard awareness as a 
priority. Despite this intention, only 28% reported exercising their emergency plan with a 
public briefing in the past five years. This leads the researcher to question what is causing 
this gap between LEPC priorities and actions. The current socio-political climate of 
terrorist fears has certainly encumbered the idea of informing the public. Emergency 
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Management is looking for ways to best balance community right-to-know with national 
security concerns. Practitioners need to work to align their organizational values and 
goals with their activities and practices. Undoubtedly, these groups have very limited 
resources of both time and money, and need to focus their limited faculties on priority 
goals first (first of which is likely maintaining and updating their ERP). Based on their 
stated priorities and on those set out by EPCRA, more attention needs to be given to 
community education and information to improve LEPC community outcomes.  
 This indicates that while LEPCs are complying with the letter of the law, they are 
not in compliance with the spirit of the law. SARA III’s intent was to use informational 
regulation to use stakeholder pressure to improve chemical safety in communities. This is 
simply not being done, despite emergency managers expressing a desire to still prioritize 
communication with the public.  
 In addition to concerns with information access, over the last several decades 
EHS facilities have been moving out of highly-populated areas towards more 
undeveloped “greenfield” areas (Falit-Baiamonte & Osleeb, 2000; Rabe, 1994). EHS 
facilities have been pushed to site themselves in less densely populated regions as a part 
of the “NIMBY” (not in my backyard) and “LULU” (locally unwanted land use) 
movements. This trend may be viewed as beneficial by neighborhoods that no longer see 
the blight of chemical facilities and factories near where they live and work. But what is 
the consequence of this relocation to emergency management? Are the capabilities of 
emergency managers in these areas on par with those in denser urban areas?  
 The results of this dissertation show a correlation between number of EHS 
facilities in a county and the compliance of that county’s LEPC. This would seem a 
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positive result, as it shows a relationship between more facilities (hazard) and greater 
compliance. This would seem to be a step towards balancing resources towards 
communities most in need. There is also a negative correlation between number of 
accidents and population size, meaning there is a relationship between larger county 
population size and fewer accidents reported in the last five years.  
 This leads to a few interesting questions. If there is indeed a relationship between 
population size and number of accidents, how does this relate to the trend of facilities 
moving out of populous areas?   Do these LEPCs in more populous areas have greater 
access to resources? Public administration literatures cites numerous examples of 
organizations in more heavily populated areas having greater access to resources, both 
tangible and intangible, which leads to greater performance. If there are fewer accidents 
reported in the last five years in areas with greater population, than the converse is true 
that there are relatively more accidents in areas with smaller populations (compared to 
areas with greater population). These less densely populated areas are likely areas EHS 
facilities have trended towards locating in recent decades. Less populated areas may also 
be more likely to contain less compliant or proactive LEPCs, who may also be less 
educated and potentially less well-funded. This is certainly an area in need of further 
investigation, as the above questions indicate.  
 All emergency planners have been stretched thinner and thinner, figuratively, with 
additional responsibilities of homeland security in addition to chemical safety tasks, and 
little to no additional funding. Where can underfunded, overburdened, remotely located 
LEPCs turn to for aid in critical instances of emergency planning? This researcher 
proposes they turn to collaboration. Collaborative efforts allow individual group 
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weaknesses to be combined to form stronger networks of emergency management. 
Collaborative environmental management (CEM) is one branch of collaboration that has 
been described heavily in the natural resource planning literature, and often involves 
formal collaboration between the public, private, and non-profit sectors to initiate some 
local environmental change (Koontz et al., 2004). Collaboration has been noted amongst 
emergency planning agencies between LEPCs and County Emergency Management 
Agencies (EMAs), often in the form of shared staff or resources. Collaboration can lead 
to greater success for all involved parties. As LEPCs continue to see more demands on 
their time and limited opportunities for funding, collaboration will need to be relied on 
more heavily as a means of meeting the tasks they have been mandated to complete. 
Collaboration with more private citizens and nonprofits along with knowledgeable first 
responders, industry representatives, and other emergency managers will help inform the 
planning process and better prepare communities to respond to chemical disasters. 
Collaboration can also help LEPCs work towards building and sharing “best practices.” 
Learning from the experiences of LEPCs state and nation-wide will build stronger 
mitigation and response capabilities.  
 One of the most significant potential barriers to collaboration is access to 
information. As RMP information access has become more limited and restrictive, 
collaboration between involved parties and the public is also therefore limited. This may 
call for more proactive, creative solutions on the part of regulated industry to ensure 
emergency plans contain complete hazard information within proper security protocols.  
 Based on the results of this study, the researcher would strongly recommend that 
the State of Ohio and USEPA consider re-evaluating how emergency management is 
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handled. If SARA III is to be upheld as written, more attempts need to be made at a 
national level to include stakeholders in the process and inform the public about local 
hazards. At a state level, the latitude for implementation of the law allows Ohio and other 
states to choose to focus on the emergency management approach they best see fit, within 
the guidelines of SARA III. 
Currently, the approach is very much an after the fact response and recovery 
approach. The assumption is that “normal” accidents will happen (Perrow 1984) and that  
an emergency managers job is to be best prepared to deal with those accidents when they 
do. Shifting LEPCs from a risk reduction/ risk management framework to a hazard 
elimination framework would radically re-prioritize their emergency management 
activities. Instead of being best prepared to manage accidents, a re-envisioned state or 
local emergency management agency could work to prevent accidents from ever 
occurring, through incentivizing inherent safety activities or more heavily fining the use 
and storage of large quantities of EHS, informing the public about hazards in their area, 
and planning communities with large and at-risk populations away from hazard zones. 
Taking steps towards a more long-term sustainable goal of informed, active, safer 
communities could in the long term be less costly for emergency managers and a more 
efficient use of their limited resources. It is unrealistic to think we will live in a society 
without chemicals. They are an intimate part of all of our daily lives. But the existence 
and use of chemicals should be undertaken with the utmost care and sustainable vision 
for their long-term consequence.  
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Limitations of This Study and Threats to the Validity of Inferences 
 Results of this study may be cautiously generalized to other LEPCs within the 
United States within certain parameters. There are likely many similarities between 
LEPCs in the study sample and LEPCs elsewhere. Many of the characteristics used to 
compare the study sample with the United States overall show similarities that lead to the 
idea that much of what is noted in the study sample is generalizable to any LEPC in the 
country. Demographic characteristics such as community size and characterization (rural 
to urban) can be used to classify LEPCs on the basis of similarities for generalization 
purposes. LEPCs in the study sample did have several characteristics that appeared 
differently than previously stated U.S. averages. LEPCs within the sample had higher 
rates of both funding and compliance. This may indicate that many of the issues 
identified in this study might be more pronounced in other areas of the country that have 
lower levels of funding and compliance.  
Once related to the quantity of chemicals present within the sample area (overall), 
the sample in this study may just represent one end of the spectrum of nationwide LEPC 
possibilities. As stated earlier, the Ohio region ranks fourth nationwide for TRI releases 
and quantity of hazardous chemicals stored and utilized. More chemical hazard may 
account for the higher than nation-wide average numbers found in this study. That being 
said, the results also indicate that the bulk of LEPC energy is still directed towards 
emergency plan preparation and other preparedness and response activities, and less so 
towards community education and information efforts. If these activities were examined 
from the perspective of the disaster management frameworks discussed in the literature, 
the sample LEPC works most lines up with the “risk management” and “homeland 
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security” frameworks. This author proposes that a more sustainable framework might 
include greater emphasis on prevention and precautionary measures. Taking action to 
promote removal of hazards by reducing quantities of chemicals stored, storing them in 
more stable forms (e.g solid vs. liquid) and simplifying chemical and facility processes 
are more efficient uses of emergency managers limited resources when examined from a 
long-term perspective in an increasingly complex, chaotic world. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 In general, the level of proactivity and compliance within the sample was 
relatively high. The majority of LEPCs could be considered compliant and at least 
moderately proactive. In future studies, it would be useful to address this issue by 
selecting a sample through different measures. Selecting matched sets of contrasting 
proactive/ not proactive or compliant/ not compliant groups would allow for comparison 
of other variables of interest while ensuring the contrast of the dependent variables.  
 As discussed earlier, a reconceptualization of the term “proactivity” more in line 
with the Precautionary Principle or the tenants of Inherent safety would give different 
insight into the priorities and emphases of LEPCs, particularly in a larger nationwide 
study. In a post-9/11, global climate change world with concerns of increasing terrorist 
threat uncertainty as well as climate uncertainty, are emergency managers turning to 
more precautionary or preventative means of eliminating hazards and informing the 
public, or has the added burden of homeland security responsibilities taxed an already 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ADASHI - Automated Decision-Aided System for Hazardous Incidents 
ALOHA - Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres 
CAMEO - Computer Aided Management of Emergency Operations  
DHS - Department of Homeland Security 
DOJ - Department of Justice 
DOT - Department of Transportation 
EHS - Extremely Hazardous Substances 
EMA - Emergency Management Agency 
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency 
EPCRA - Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act 
ERP - Emergency Response Plan 
FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency 
GIS - Geographic Information Systems 
HMEP - Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness 
LEPC - Local Emergency Planning Committee 
NIMS – National Incident Management System 
OEMA - Ohio Emergency Management Agency 
OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
RMP - Risk Management Plan 
SARA III -Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
SERC - State Emergency Response Commission 
USEPA - United States Environmental Protection Agency 













This questionnaire asks for information regarding the current practices of your LEPC. 
Our project focuses on the resources used by your LEPC and its practices. You have been 
contacted because you are listed as a current member of an Ohio LEPC either within 
EPA’s database or by a roster from your LEPC. 
 
Our objective for the project is to identify how LEPCs are currently functioning in Ohio.  
The results of this project will provide important information about how Ohio LEPCs are 
working. This current study is funded in part by a grant from the Maxine Levin Goodman 
Discretionary Fund, at the Levin College of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State. The study 
director is Erica Matheny, a PhD Candidate at the Levin College of Urban Affairs, under 
the advisement of Dr. William Bowen.  
 
We hope that you will find the time to participate in our current study. The questionnaire 
should take less than 20 minutes to complete. Your participation in the study is voluntary. 
The information obtained during the survey will be held in a password-protected 
computer and will only be accessible by the researchers on the project. The results will 
only be reported in summary; no individual responses will be made public.  In no way 
will your responses be identifiable to you personally.   
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, please contact the CSU 
Institutional Review Board at (216) 687-3630. By completing and submitting this survey 





If you have any questions regarding the study or this questionnaire, please contact Erica Matheny, 330-
285-4790, or Dr. William Bowen, Levin College of Urban Affairs, CSU (216-687-9226.) Ms. Matheny is 
the director of the study, under the advisement of Dr. Bowen.  
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I.  Contact Information         Check here if you’d 
  like a summary of the results 
 
Name & Position            
LEPC affiliated with           
Address            
Telephone/ Fax            
Email              
 
II.  About Your Community 
 
2. What size population does your LEPC serve? 
 < 50,000 
 50,001 – 100,000 
 100,001 – 500,000 
 500,001 – 1,000,000 
 > 1,000,000 
 
3.  How would you describe your LEPC’s service area? 
 Mainly Rural 
 Mixed Rural/ Suburban 
 Mainly Suburban 
 Mixed Suburban/ Rural 
Mainly Urban 
 
III. About LEPC Members 
4. Which of the following organizations participate in your LEPC?  Check all that 
apply. 
    Civil Defense/Emergency Services          Firefighting                     Schools 
    Chief Administrative Officer's Staff         Law Enforcement           Labor Groups 
    State/Local Elected Officials                    Public Health                  Newsmedia 
    Emergency Medical/Hospitals                  Local Industry                Agriculture 
    Municipal/County Attorney's Office         Truck/Rail Carriers        Community Groups 
    Planning/Community Development          Environmental Agency   
    Red Cross/Volunteer Groups                    Public Works/Engineering 
    Other (please list): _______________________________________________________ 
 
5a. How many members make up your LEPC?                                  ____ members 




6. How long has the current LEPC chair... 0-12 mos. 1-2 yrs 3-4 yrs 5+ yrs 
   been a member of the LEPC                                                     
     been chair of the LEPC .....................................                                                   
 
7.      a. Does your LEPC have any paid full or part-time staff?     Yes     No      
         b. How many hours per week do they work for the LEPC?       ______ hours    
   8. Does your LEPC... 
 have a formal orientation program for new member ............................   Yes        No      
    have any subcommittees .......................................................................   Yes        No      
    set annual goals and objectives for itself ..............................................   Yes        No      
    set annual goals and objectives for its subcommittees..........................   Yes        No      
    assess its performance annually or more frequently .............................   Yes        No      
    discuss this performance appraisal within the LEPC ............................   Yes        No      
    present the performance appraisal orally or in writing to local officials   Yes      No      
 
IV. About your LEPCs Activities 
 
9. How many times did your LEPC meet during the last year (2008)? 
_____________________ 
 
10. Where does your LEPCs operating budget come from? (check all that apply) 
 State fees from EPCRA submission 
Federal – HMEP grant funding 
Local direct funding 
Other state direct funding 
 Local fees 
 Private Industry 
 In-kind/Indirect support 
 Other 
 No formal funding or direct support 
 
11. In the past five years, did your LEPC receive technical assistance or guidance from 
any of the following agencies? 
 Federal EPA 
Department of Homeland Security 
Department of Transportation 
Department of Justice 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
State agencies (SERC, OEMA, OEPA) 
 
12. When did your LEPC last review and update its emergency response plan? 
 Less than 12 months 
 1-2 years 
 over 2 years 
 Do not have an emergency response plan 
 Do not know when last reviewed/updated 
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13. When did the State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) last review your 
emergency response plan? 
 Less than 12 months 
 1-2 years 
 over 2 years 
 No Review 
 
14. How familiar are you with your LEPC’s emergency response plan? 
 Very Familiar 
 Familiar 
 Somewhat Familiar 
 Slightly Familiar 
 Not at all Familiar 
 
EXERCISE ERP 
15. Has your LEPC exercised its emergency plan through a: 
   a. single function (e.g., communications) drill ...................................    Yes        No      
   b. “table-top” hazmat exercise  ...........................................................    Yes        No      
   c. full scale (i.e., multidepartmental) hazmat emergency exercise .....    Yes        No      
   d.   Actual emergency ...........................................................................    Yes        No 
   e.    Public briefing ................................................................................    Yes        No 
   f.    Other _(please list)__________________________________________________ 
 
16. When did your LEPC last exercise its emergency plan? 
 Less than 12 months 
 1-2 years 
 over 2 years 
 Exercised, do not know when 
 
17. In the past five years, approximately how many chemical accidents to which 





 15 or more 
 
18. How did these chemical accidents impact the way your LEPC operates? (check all 
that apply) 
 No impact 
 Revised ERP 
 Improved coordination 
 Extended LEPC 
         Increased meeting frequency 




19. How many facilities in your area exceed the Threshold Planning Quantity of 
Extremely Hazardous Substances?                                
       
 ____________ facilities 
20. For how many facilities have you determined the size of their Vulnerable Zones using 
      DOT's Emergency Response Guidebook____________ facilities 
        EPA's Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis ____________ facilities 
        computer models (e.g., CAMEO or ALOHA)____________ facilities 
        GIS____________ facilities 
              other methods____________ facilities 
              (Please list)______________________________________________________. 
 
21. Which of the following resources does your LEPC employ for chemical 
information, emergency planning, drills, and actual emergencies? 
CAMEO 
Risk Management Program (RMP) data 
Other GIS data 
EPCRA Tier I & Tier II data 
Other resources (please 
list)_________________________________________________ 
22.    Please rate the degree to which your LEPC has used each of  
 the following resources in SARA Title III emergency planning. 
  Not  Very great 
   a. National Response Team Hazardous Materials Emergency at all extent 
  Planning Guide (NRT-1)  ............................................................. 1 2 3 4 5 
   b. EPA technical guidebooks or planning manuals ............................ 1 2 3 4 5 
   c.   State emergency planning agency  
  hazardous materials planning manuals & training courses .......... 1 2 3 4 5 
   d. Chemical Manufacturers Association videotapes, handbooks, 
   & training courses ......................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
   e. FEMA or EPA training courses or broadcasts ................................ 1 2 3 4 5 
   f. State environmental agency Toxic Release Inventory  data ............ 1 2 3 4 5 
   g. guest speakers ................................................................................. 1 2 3 4 5 
   h. other training films or videotapes ................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
 
23. Please rate the degree to which your LEPC was active 
 in each of the following areas during 2008. Not  Very great 
  at all extent 
   a. Hazard vulnerability assessment  .................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
   b. Community emergency preparedness ............................................. 1 2 3 4 5 
   c. Chemical release prevention ........................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
   d. Community hazard awareness ........................................................ 1 2 3 4 5 
   e.   Community hazard reduction .......................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
   f.    Inherent safety opportunity audits .................................................. 1 2 3 4 5 
   g.   Activities that reward hazard reduction .......................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
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24. Since the events of 9/11, the overall activity of your LEPC has: 
 Increased greatly 
 Increased somewhat 
 Stayed the same 
 Decreased somewhat 
 Decreased greatly 
 Don’t know 
25. Since 9/11, has your LEPCs increased its emphasis on: 
 Emergency planning 
 Hazard reduction/ Accident prevention 
 Educating the public 
 Being proactive 
26. Since 9/11, has your LEPC changed the way chemical hazard information is made 
available to the public due to homeland security concerns? 
 Yes 
 No 
27. The LEPC on which I serve has had a positive impact on chemical safety in the 
community (prevention, preparedness, and response.) 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 No 
28.  Which of the following terms are you familiar with or do  
        you believe your LEPC incorporates into its mission?           I’m Familiar   LEPCs 
                                                                                                                           mission 
 Inherent safety .................................................................................     
 Precautionary principle ...................................................................     
 Primary Prevention .........................................................................     
         Hazard Reduction ............................................................................     
29.   Rank your LEPC’s contact (telephone, letter, email, or face-to-face) with each of the 
following during 2008, from most frequent (#1) to least frequent (#9). (#0 for not 
applicable)  
  _____ FEMA regional staff 
  _____ EPA regional staff 
  _____ State emergency management agency 
  _____ State environmental agency 
  _____ LEPCs in adjacent jurisdictions 
  _____ LEPCs in other jurisdictions of your state 
  _____ LEPCs in other states 
  _____ Regional or Multi-jurisdictional LEPC Association 
  _____ Other __________________________________________________ 
Does your LEPC have a website? If so, please list here: _________________________ 
 141 
 
30.    Is there any other information that you feel is important for us to know regarding 







 Thank you very much for your participation in our research.  If you are 
interested in receiving a summary of this research when it is completed, please 























IRB APPROVAL FORM 
 
